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Choosing Affordable Health Insurance
Govind Persad*
ABSTRACT
The Affordable Care Act ("ACA") made health insurance accessible to
many. Yet unaffordable insurancestill abounds. This Article proposes a strategy for improving affordability that enables health insurance purchasers to
choose, within reasonable limits, which treatments their insurance covers.
After critiquing recently proposed strategies for improving affordability
and reviewing past legal scholarship on content choice in health insurance,
this Article introduces the "Affordable Choices" framework. This framework
regulates choice in four ways. First, health plans should only exclude treatments whose merits are subject to reasonable disagreement among patients
and physicians. Second, plans should appeal to purchasers'health-related values-values about the sort of life they want to live-rather than predictions
about their health status. Third, plans should include interventions like vaccines that protect others from harm. Fourth, excluded interventions should be
those costly enough that exclusion meaningfully shifts affordability. This Article will then discuss potentialplan offerings, such as "internationalreference
coverage" based on nationalplans in other developed countries like Canada
or the United Kingdom, and discuss what legal reforms-if any-would be
needed in order to offer Affordable Choices plans as part of ACA exchanges,
employer-provided insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid.
This Article then considers legal and ethical objections that ill people,
plan purchasers, society, or providers might advance. It first addresses the objection that Affordable Choices plans will unfairly raise health insurance costs
for less healthy people and argues that requiringplans to appeal to healthrelated values rather than health status expectations will help to avoid this
problem. It then explains how the Affordable Choices framework can be
structured to protect purchasers from misprediction or choice overload.
Turning to objectionsfrom society, this Article explains how choice about
the content of insurance is compatible with solidarity among insuredpatients,

albeit liberal solidarity (focused on the framework that enables choice for all)
rather than communitarian solidarity (focused on the substantive content of
individuals' choices). It also explains how Affordable Choices plans can be
compatible with state requirements regarding specific benefits and with an*
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tidiscriminationlaw. Last, it explains why participationin Affordable Choices
plans accords, ratherthan conflicts, with providers'legal obligations and ethical duties, and argues that providers are not only permitted but ethically encouraged to protect patients from financial hardship.
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INTRODUCTION

The Affordable Care Act ("ACA")' made insurance accessible to
many. Yet unaffordable insurance still abounds: a couple in Missouri
pays nearly $17,000 in yearly premiums with a $4,500 deductible;2 a
Pennsylvania real estate agent pays over $9,000 with a $4,000 deductible; 3 and when premiums reached nearly $20,000 with a deductible of
$7,500, a pair of early retirees decided not to get health insurance at
all. 4
These costly plans most commonly confront older individual marketplace buyers whose income is too high for them to receive subsidies.5 But rising premiums and out-of-pocket costs also bedevil buyers
I

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Star. 119 (2010).

2

Steven Findlay, Rising Health Insurance Costs Frighten Some Early Retirees, KAISER

HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://khn.org/news/rising-health-insurance-costs-frighten-someearly-retirees/ [https://perma.cc/D6W5-9LUG]. An insurance deductible is the amount of money
that an insured patient has to pay out of pocket before insurance begins to cover costs. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH

HEALTH

&

HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE

COVERAGE AND

MEDICAL TERMS

&

MEDICAID SERVS., GLOSSARY OF

1, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/

Downloads/uniform-glossary-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG83-TF25].
3 Steven Findlay, Health Insurance Costs Crushing Many People Who Don't Get Federal
Subsidies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://khn.org/news/health-insurance-costscrushing-many-people-who-dont-get-federal-subsidies/

[https://perma.cc/5ZJT-4SLB].

4 Julie Rovner, Steep Premiums Challenge People Who Buy Health Insurance Without

Subsidies, NPR (Oct. 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/07/55
5957419/steep-premiums-challenge-people-who-buy-health-insurance-without-subsidies

[https://

perma.cc/B48E-QZCV].
5

See Govind Persad, Expensive Patients, Fair Sharing, and the Future of Health Care

Reform, 69 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 25), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3584782 [https://perma.cc/QR24-67DK]; Jonathan Cohn, An Iowa Teen-

ager Didn't Wreck His State's Health Care Market. Here's Who Did, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29,
2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iowa-teenager-obamacare-scapegoat_us_

59f4715de4b077d8dfc9dd70 [https://perma.cc/TA7C-ZS5U].
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with employer-based insurance, 6 which has served to fuel backlash
against the ACA more generally. Many strategies to rein in costs only
produce new problems. "Copper plans" reduce up-front premiums but
increase already high out-of-pocket costs.7 Plans without preexisting
condition protections save money for the currently healthy, but only
by undermining access for the sick. 8 And subsidizing the purchase of
costly insurance can improve affordability for purchasers, but worsens
it for society.9
This Article proposes improving affordability through choice.
People typically have a choice among different goods and services,
even for essentials like housing and food. House hunters, for instance,
can select the home that best fits their values and needs, or can choose
to rent or buy. Insurance purchasers have similar reasons for wanting
to customize the content of their insurance benefits. One important
value that choice could help realize is affordability: savings from limiting benefits could lower premiums, deductibles, or copayments. Another is autonomy: choice enables insurance purchasers to select
access to treatments that accord with their values and forgo access to
treatments that do not.
That health insurance, unlike housing, involves risk pooling might
seem to preclude content choice. If one person purchases a home with
stairs, for instance, that does not make a step-free home unaffordable
for a neighbor with a mobility impairment. But the ability to purchase
a plan without coverage for mobility impairments could make plans
that include such coverage unaffordable for that neighbor, who is now
unable to pool risk. Some reject choice as infeasible for this reason.10
This Article draws a different conclusion. Because insurance involves
risk pooling, insurance content must be more tightly regulated than
home design. But it does not render choice over the content of insurance infeasible or inevitably unfair. While the cost of some medical
treatments must be borne in common, the cost of others can be an
appropriate object for choice, even if permitting choice lowers insur6

SARA

R.

COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE COVER-

AGE EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE ACA 6 (2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Collins_hltinscoverage_8_years-afterACA_2018_biennial-survey-sb-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SMC-YLEN] (observing that "the greatest growth in the number of underinsured adults is occurring among those in employer health plans").
7 See infra Section I.A.
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 See infra
10

See,

Section I.C.

e.g., NICHOLAS BAGLEY

ET

AL.,

CORRECTING SIGNALS FOR

INNOVATION

HEALTH CARE 8-9 (2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/correcting-signals-for
innovationinhealth_carebagley.pdf [https://perma.cc/64C4-966A].
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ance costs for some and raises them for others. Choice about the content of health insurance can be fair when it reflects a purchaser's
health-related values-values about what sort of life is best-rather
than factual predictions about future health status. An example of this
contrast is the difference between a preference not to receive costly,
life extending treatments if one develops dementia, and a belief that
one is unlikely to develop dementia.
Both choice and its absence have been perennially controversial
in health reform debates. Health insurance designs that emphasize
choice, exemplified by early 2000s "consumer-directed health care,"
have been criticized for inappropriately allowing market principles to
colonize health care." Yet proposals to reduce or eliminate choice,
such as the rise of restrictive managed care in the 1990s or more recent concerns that ACA plans limit choice of providers, have
prompted strong public backlash. 2 This Article recognizes the downsides of choice, including the tension between choice and solidarity
and the psychological burden that options can impose on decisionmakers.3 But it also recognizes the value of choice to affordability
and to non-economic values like autonomy and dignity. Choice about
the content of health insurance, compared to a one-size-fits-all regime,
enables people to direct their health spending toward achieving outcomes they value. It also respects dignity and promotes autonomy by
allowing people to shape their lives according to their commitments.
Section L.A of this Article reviews the problem of affordability in
American health insurance and critiques some existing proposals that
aim to improve affordability. Section I.B then critically examines past
discussions of content choice in health insurance by law and health
policy scholars.
Part II introduces the "Affordable Choices" framework for content choice in health insurance. Section II.A identifies principles for
designing Affordable Choices plans. These plans should be broadly
appealing, rather than attractive only to people who expect their fu"

E.g., Kristin Madison & Peter D. Jacobson, Consumer-DirectedHealth CareDebate, 156

U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 107, 115 (2007) (section by Prof. Jacobson) (criticizing consumerdirected health care for "transforming health care into just another market commodity").
12

See Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction and

Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 241 (2000) ("The evidence of a backlash against managed care
reflects considerable frustration with constraints on patient choice."); Allison K. Hoffman,
Health Care's Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 7-8)
(on file with Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law) (describing backlash against ACA's disruptive
effects on provider choice).
13

See infra Section IV.D.
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ture health status to deviate from the norm, and should include interventions (like vaccines and prenatal care) that have large positive
consequences for society. Interventions excluded should only be those
that are subject to reasonable disagreement among patients and physicians and are costly enough for exclusion to meaningfully shift affordability. Section II.B explains the categories of potential
Affordable Choices offerings, including "international reference coverage" plans based on the sets of interventions offered in other developed countries like Canada or the United Kingdom. Section II.C
describes the logistics of offering an Affordable Choices plan on an
ACA exchange. Section II.D discusses what legal changes, if any,
would be needed in order to offer Affordable Choices plans in various
settings, including exchanges, employer-provided plans, Medicare,

and Medicaid.
Parts III, IV, V, and VI consider potential obstacles to the Affordable Choices framework that ill people, plan purchasers, society,
or providers might raise. Part III focuses on the ethical objection that
content choice will unfairly raise health insurance costs for less
healthy people by fragmenting the risk pool and the legal objection
that Affordable Choices plans are unlawfully discriminatory. Part IV
addresses the concern that the availability of Affordable Choices
plans would be psychologically burdensome or produce bad outcomes
because buyers will mispredict their future values and needs. Part V
answers the objection that choice undermines social solidarity by proposing an ideal of liberal solidarity compatible with choice. Part VI
discusses and rebuts two objections that health care providers might
raise-that Affordable Choices plans require them to abandon their
duty to do what is medically best for patients and that they expose
providers to the risk of malpractice liability.
This Article's proposal is compatible with other efforts to improve health insurance access, affordability, and quality. Some have
proposed improving affordability by targeting excessive pricing.14
Others have suggested measures to reduce the monopoly power of
large providers such as hospitals.15 Still others have proposed efforts
to reduce unnecessary treatment.1 6 Politicians have suggested expanding access to Medicare and Medicaid or replacing private insur14 E.g., Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's Still the Prices, Stupid: Why the US Spends So Much
on Health Care, and a Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFF. 87, 89 (2019).
15 E.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1564, 1568

(2017).
16

E.g., SHANNON

BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED

(2007).
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ance entirely with public insurance.1' As Part II explains, even a move
to exclusively public insurance is compatible with offering content
choice as part of an insurance package.
Recent developments around health insurance have improved
prospects for the type of content choice this Article proposes. There is
increasing bipartisan willingness to borrow from other countries' strategies for stemming health care costs.1 8 This makes Section II.B's proposal for international reference coverage more compelling.
Meanwhile, although "copper plans" will likely be ineffective, their
bipartisan popularity suggests the potential appeal of offering lower
and more predictable costs in exchange for a more restricted menu of
treatments.1 9 And whether the ACA survives or is ultimately replaced
by something else, widespread uncertainty and dissatisfaction around
current health insurance arrangements may make a new option more

appealing.
I.

ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABILITY PROBLEM

Before the ACA, Americans had a difficult time accessing affordable health insurance, especially in the individual market.2 0 Affordability was a particular problem for people who had previously
suffered illnesses: For them, insurance was often prohibitively expensive or excluded treatment for preexisting illnesses.21 Insured patients
who became ill were refused plan renewal or were kicked off their
plans. 22 Although "cheap" insurance was available via short-term
plans or via "mini-med" plans that capped insurance benefits at less
17 Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 15,
2019), https://www.kff.org/interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public-plan-proposals/
[https://

perma.cc/CF2R-EU4P].
18

See Billy Wynne & Alyssa Llamas, New Legislation to Control Drug Prices: How Do

House and Senate Bills Compare? An Update, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 9, 2020), https://
www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2020/new-legislation-control-drug-prices-how-do-house-andsenate-bills-compare-update [https://perma.cc/PBN5-3R9D] (discussing the use of international
price comparisons in the House's Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act and in a
proposed rule issued in 2018 by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
19

See infra Section I.A.

20 John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Does Small Group Health Insurance Deliver Group Benefits?

An Argument in Favor of Allowing the Small Group Market to Die, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1161
(2018); Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 144 (2017); Amy
Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Healthcare Reform by Dumping Sick
Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 176 (2011).
21

Maher, supra note 20, at 144.

22

See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 136 ("Those who did acquire coverage were

subject to preexisting condition exclusions and the prospect of rescissions.").
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than $10,000,23 affordable insurance that covered preexisting conditions was not. Insurance purchasers with illnesses faced the choice between cheap junk plans, prohibitively expensive plans, and
uninsurance.
The ACA addressed these problems by requiring all insurers selling individual market plans to cover willing buyers regardless of preexisting conditions, and to cover a broad set of essential health
benefits.2 4 The ACA also limited insurers' ability to vary premiums by
health status. Higher or lower rates were only permitted, at regulated
percentages, for specific factors such as tobacco use and wellness program participation.2 5
The ACA succeeded in providing more Americans with comprehensive health insurance.2 6 But the plans offered on the ACA's individual marketplaces also tended to have high premiums. To improve
affordability, the ACA subsidized both premiums and out-of-pocket
costs for lower-income households enrolled in marketplace plans. 27
But individual market customers who were ineligible for these subsidies faced high premiums, deductibles, and copayments. 28 Middleaged and older patients in the individual market faced the highest premiums, especially in states where individual markets were small or
populated by particularly costly patients.2 9 Buyers whose premiums
exceed a specified percent of their income were exempted from the
ACA's individual mandate, but this still left them exposed to the unbounded financial risk of uninsurance. 30 These high premiums for
middle-income buyers engendered substantial backlash against the
ACA.31 These problems have prompted efforts to improve the af23 See Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit
Standardizationand Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable CareAct, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 306,

308 (2011).
24

Maher, supra note 20, at 145.

25 Id.

note 6, at 3.

26

COLLINS ET AL., supra

27

Maher, supra note 20, at 146.

28

See Rachel Fehr et al., How Affordable Are 2019 ACA Premiums for Middle-Income

People?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/
how-affordable-are-2019-aca-premiums-for-middle-income-people/

[https://perma.cc/9WP4-

72KA].
29 See Persad, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25); Cohn, supra note 5.
30 Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J.
CORP. L. 781, 791 (2011) ("This group is a middle income group; they are not poor enough to
qualify for a subsidy, but not well-off enough to be penalized for failing to purchase coverage.").
The individual mandate has since been eliminated. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L.

No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017).
31 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39
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fordability of insurance plans under the ACA. The remainder of this
Part reviews and critiques existing proposals for improving insurance
affordability in order to motivate the potential attractiveness of the
Affordable Choices proposal.
A.

Copper Plans

In response to affordability concerns, politicians (both Democratic and Republican) and trade groups (such as America's Health
Insurance Plans) have proposed "copper plans," which are insurance
plans with lower premiums than those currently offered in the individual marketplace. 32 Copper plans, however, also have lower actuarial
value in the form of higher deductibles or copayments. 33
Some have defended copper plans on the basis that the ACA
"forces some people to get more insurance than they want." 34 But
copper plans do not protect people from having to buy more than they
want; they simply allow purchasers to gamble on whether they will
have to pay for health care. Although copper plan purchasers save
money upfront by paying lower premiums, they face higher deductibles and copayments when they eventually get sick and require medical care.3 5 Copper plans-whose deductibles exceed those of current
bronze plans while covering the same interventions as current gold
CARDOzO

L.

REV.

413, 437 (2017); Joan C. Williams, What So Many People Don't Get About the

U.S. Working Class, HARV. Bus. REV. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-manypeople-dont-get-about-the-u-s-working-class

[https://perma.cc/A43Z-W5JU]; Abby Goodnough,
As Some Got Free Health Care, Gwen Got Squeezed: An Obamacare Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
19,

2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/health/obamacare-premiums-medicaid.html

[https://perma.cc/5M97-X9KE].
32 E.g., Deborah B. Gardner, Dismantle or Improve Obamacare?Nurses Must Take Action, 32 NURSING ECON. 323, 325 (2014) ("Republicans want to introduce a new metal levelcopper, which would cover about 50% of medical bills.").
33 E.g., David Anderson, Why Current Copper Plan Proposals Won't Work, HEALTH AFF.

(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180803.744146/ful/ [https://per
ma.cc/W8NT-Q8J5] ("In 2013, Senator Mark Begich (D-AK) was a lead proponent of offering
50 percent actuarial value plans. A 50 percent actuarial value copper plan in 2019 would likely
have a deductible and maximum out of pocket of $12,000 to $13,000."); Alexander Bolton, Senate GOP Plots Plan B for ObamaCare, HILL (Jan. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/home
news/senate/230798-senate-gop-plots-plan-b-for-obamacare

[https://perma.cc/N3R7-WLE4]

(noting that "centrist Democrats including Sens. Joe Manchin (W.Va.), Mark Warner (Va.) and
Heidi Heitkamp (N.D.) ...

[proposed] a new high-deductible health insurance option known as

the Copper Plan that would cost less while still meeting the standards of the Affordable Care
Act").
34 Jonathan Cohn, This Is How the New GOP Senate Will Try to Dismantle Obamacare,
NEw REPUBLIC (Nov. 4, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120125/republican-plans-obama-

care-device-tax-mandates-risk-corridors [https://perma.cc/DJX8-MCP6].
35 See id.; see also Ezra Klein, 7 Democrats Have a Plan to Make Obamacare Cheaper.
Here's How, Vox (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/28/7083343/obamacare-
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plans-poorly fit the needs of most working and middle-class households with limited savings.36
Rather than being more affordable, copper plans are better described as more unpredictable: Their lower premiums make them
cheaper for those who stay healthy, but their higher deductibles and
copayments make them costlier for those who get sick. This contravenes a core aim of insurance: to transfer resources from people who
do not experience losses to people who do.37 This problem is exacerbated by copper plans' surface appeal. People may be attracted by
lower premiums and not think about the future cost of copayments
and deductibles if they become ill.38
B.

Cost Shifting to the Sick

Another strategy for lowering premiums, which the Trump Administration is currently pursuing, would expand the sale of plans that
are not subject to the ACA's rules. These include short-term health
plans, which the Administration wants to expand to include 364-day
periods with renewability for up to 36 months, 39 and association health
plans, which were historically limited to small businesses but which
the Administration has sought to let a broader range of buyers access. 40 Association health plans may vary premiums based on factors
that are disallowed in the individual marketplace, such as gender and
the industry in which someone is employed.4 ' Short-term plans are
even less regulated than association health plans and are permitted to
copper-plans-explained

[https://perma.cc/Y2FF-5P92] ("Basically, you're paying for insurance

that doesn't protect you unless you get really, really sick.").
36 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured:Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 433 (2001)
("Only the very wealthy, or the very poor, can afford to self-insure for sickness and accident
without risking financial disaster.").
37 See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices:Beyond Bad Faith, 47 TORT
TRIAL

&

INS. PRAC. L.J. 693, 711 (2012).

38 See Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 23, at 306-07.
39 Dylan Scott, Trump's New Plan to Poke Holes in the Obamacare Markets, Explained,

Vox (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/20/17031640/
short-term-insurance-trump-obamacare [https://perma.cc/GQ2U-26L6].
40 See Michelle Andrews, Read the Fine PrintBefore Picking an Association Planfor Your
Small Business, NPR (June 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/

06/27/623626154/read-the-fine-print-before-picking-bout-an-association-plan-for-your-smallbusin [https://perma.cc/J7WG-EJE9]. The Association Health Plan expansion was struck down
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, but the decision is currently being ap-

pealed. See New York v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 363 F. Supp. 3d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal
filed, No. 19-5125 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2019).
41

See Andrews, supra note 40.
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exclude patients with preexisting conditions, charge them higher premiums, or exclude health benefits that the ACA defines as essential.42
As critics of short-term and association health plans argue, the
Trump Administration's approach reduces premiums for healthy buyers by shifting costs to patients with preexisting conditions. 43 The
availability of these plans would probably most harm middle-aged and
older patients with high premiums who are more likely to have preexisting conditions than younger patients. Some of the Administration's
defenders argue that preexisting conditions typically result from irresponsible conduct and that others should not be required to pay the
cost of treating them. 44 But many preexisting conditions do not reflect
irresponsible conduct. 45 Even when these conditions are attributable
in part to irresponsibility, it is disproportionate to expose patients with
them to the unlimited risks of uninsurance.
C.

Increasing Subsidies

Some legislators have proposed offsetting the impact of rising
premiums by extending subsidies to households making over 400% of
the federal poverty line. California is using state funds to subsidize
42

David McFarlane & Alice Hall-Partyka, Court Upholds Short-Term, Limited Duration

Insurance Policy Rule, C&M HEALTH LAw (July 23, 2019), https://www.cmhealthlaw.com/2019/
07/court-upholds-short-term-limited-duration-insurance-policy-rule/
9AVG];

[https://perma.cc/2U8A-

Seven Health Organizations File Lawsuit Against the Short-Term, Limited-Duration

Plan Final Rule, AM.

PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N

(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/

news-releases/seven-health-organizations-file-lawsuit-against-the-short-term-limited-durationplan-final-rule

[https://perma.cc/Q7AQ-AH3V]. While Affordable Choices plans also permit

purchasers to opt out of certain health benefits, their goal is to allow purchasers to select plans
based on their values; in contrast, short-term plans are pitched as allowing purchasers to select
plans based on expected medical needs. See, e.g., Jayne O'Donnell & Ken Alltucker, President
Donald Trump's Answer to Obamacare: Short-Term Health Insurance, USA TODAY (Aug. 1,
2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/08/01/president-trumps-an
swer-obamacare-short-term-health-insurance/879337002/

[https://perma.cc/B293-KR5B] (report-

ing that experts believe short-term plans "may appeal to healthier adults who don't need coverage for a chronic disease but want to spend less on health insurance premiums").
43 See, e.g., Kevin Lucia & Sabrina Corlette, It's All About the Rating: Touted "Benefits" of
Association Health Plans Ignore Key Facts, CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS (Feb. 4, 2019), http:/
/chirblog.org/its-all-about-the-rating/

[https://perma.cc/JC9U-8DSY]; Dania Palanker et al.,
States Step Up to ProtectInsurance Markets and Consumersfrom Short- Term Health Plans, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 2, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/

2019/may/states-step-up-protect-markets-consumers-short-term-plans
NDRJ].

[https://perma.cc/NH6A-

44 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, GOP Legislator Says Healthy People Lead "Good Lives," Should
Get Cheaper Health Insurance, Vox (May 2, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-

politics/2017/5/2/15514006/mo-brooks-preexisting-conditions

[https://perma.cc/D9GD-PRFU].

45 See id. (discussing "expensive health care conditions that aren't the result of any choice
at all," such as epilepsy and multiple sclerosis).
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premiums for households below 600% of the poverty line,4 6 and a bill
to provide all households subsidies has been proposed in Congress. 47
Increasing subsidies would cushion households in the individual
market against rising premium costs, but would shift those costs onto
the shoulders of the broader public. While preferable to shifting costs
onto the shoulders of the sick, insurance subsidies are likely not a high
priority for public spending. The United States arguably already overspends on health care in comparison to other social spending, and
could achieve greater health improvement by spending on education,
environmental improvement, housing, or even direct income assistance to households. 48 Spending money to subsidize middle- and upper-income households' access to insurance while doing nothing to
limit the price of insurance is unlikely to be an efficient way of improving health. While increasing subsidies for the purchase of health
insurance remains compatible with this Article's proposal for allowing
greater content choice, content choice could obviate the need for increased subsidies.
An alternative to increasing subsidies for private insurance is to
replace private insurance with publicly provided insurance, thereby
partially or fully replacing premiums with taxes. Like increasing subsidies, a publicly provided insurance system is compatible with content
choice. 49 Furthermore, content choice could help address two of the
biggest challenges for expanding publicly provided insurance. First, it
could avoid drawing a controversial categorical line between interventions that are provided at public expense to all and those that are

46 Samantha Young & Ana B. Ibarra, California Gov. Newsom Proposes Penalty to Fund
Health Insurance Subsidies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 4, 2019), https://khn.org/news/newsomproposes-penalty-to-fund-health-insurance-subsidies/ [https://perma.cc/8NUW-JDZJ].
47

Katie Keith, House Democrats Introduce Bill to Strengthen the ACA, HEALTH AFF.

(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190327.894190/ful/
ma.cc/V547-QJLX].

[https://per

48 See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., Health and Social Services Expenditures:Associations with Health Outcomes, 20 BMJ QUALITY

&

SAFETY 826, 829 (2011) ("[T]he ratio of social

expenditures to health expenditures may influence health outcomes beyond that which results
from health spending alone."); M. Gabriela Alcalde, How to Build Healthy Places Through
Cross-Sector Collaboration, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/

10.1377/hblog20151007.051063/full/

[https://perma.cc/V547-QJLX]

(examining how Kentucky

has improved public health by targeting "various sectors that contribute to making a community

healthy").
49 See Robert M. Veatch, Single Payers and Multiple Lists: Must Everyone Get the Same
Coverage in a Universal Health Plan?, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 153, 155 (1997) (explaining
how single-payer insurance could include different packages of benefits).
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available to none.50 Second, by making the plans cheaper, it could reduce the amount of tax revenue needed to fund access to the publicly
provided plan.51
D.

Allowing Content Choice

The shortcomings of the aforementioned strategies highlight the
appeal of content choice as an alternative route to affordable health
insurance. This Section provides an overview and analysis of past
scholarly discussions of content choice. At the outset, it is important
to differentiate content choice-choice about which interventions are
covered-from other forms of choice about insurance that have been
offered or advocated. The ACA and many prior proposals provide an
extensively or completely standardized package of interventions, but
permit choice among different insurers who administer the standardized package or among different ways of paying for that standardized
package. The main goal of offering this form of choice is to incentivize
insurers to lower costs, rather than to enhance individual autonomy.
Consider, for instance, Alain Enthoven's classic proposal for a "consumer-choice health plan." 52 Enthoven advocates a marketplace in
which insurers must all offer at least a federally standardized benefits
package. 53 While insurers are permitted to offer benefits over and
above the package, the central goal of Enthoven's consumer choice
proposal is not to enable consumers to select insurance coverage that
matches their conception of a good life, but rather to subject insurers
to market discipline that constrains insurance costs and incentivizes
insurers to bargain with providers for lower-cost medical care. 54 The
critique that purchasers are ill equipped to navigate choices about pre50 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Problem with Single-Payer Plans, HASTINGS
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 38, 41.
51
2017),

CTR. REP.,

See Robert H. Frank, Why Single-Payer Health Care Saves Money, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/upshot/why-single-payer-health-care-saves-money

.html [https://perma.cc/8ASZ-47BW]; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Make No Mistake:
Medicare for All Would Cut Taxes for Most Americans, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/25/medicare-for-all-taxes-saez-zucman

[https://perma

.cc/AT6E-NJ24].
52 See Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan: A National-Health-Insurance
Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 709

(1978).
53 Id. at 714; see also Alain C. Enthoven, Effective Management of Competition in the
FEHBP, 8 HEALTH AFF. 33, 42 (1989) (praising an approach where "all health plans ...

cover

exactly the same list of covered services, subject to the same limits, copayments, and deductibles" and stating that "there is a strong presumption in favor of standardization").
54 See Enthoven, supra note 53, at 42 (describing the goal of managed competition as "to
motivate managed care plans to produce a favorable combination of efficiency and equity").
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miums, deductibles, and copayments55 may not apply, or at least not
so strongly, to proposals that would allow purchasers to select among
plans that genuinely differ in content while potentially being more
standardized along these other dimensions.
1.

Critiquing Content Choice

The most recent critique of content choice is a 2015 Hamilton
Project white paper by the legal academic Nicholas Bagley and the
health economists Austin Frakt and Amitabh Chandra. 56 Bagley,
Chandra, and Frakt open by identifying problems stemming from the
absence of content choice:
A combination of legal rules and institutional pressures ...
forces consumers into . . . plans that cover the same healthcare technologies. As a result, consumers have no choice but
to insure themselves against the risk of needing expensive
care of marginal clinical value-even if they would prefer to
purchase cheaper coverage that excluded such care. That, in
turn, sends an "if you build it, we will pay for it" signal to
technology developers, encouraging them to invest in new
technologies that yield incremental benefits without regard
to cost. 57
The authors recognize that even though values and wealth affect
demand for health care, "instead of buying health plans that meet
their variable demand, the rich and poor alike must buy plans that
cover health-care technologies of questionable value." 5 8 They also
note that "[t]he welfare consequences of making people buy the same
health plan are perhaps even larger than making them purchase the
same cars, computers, or colleges, which nobody would consider realistic and few would consider desirable." 59
Despite recognizing the potential attractiveness of allowing
health plans to differ in content, Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt conclude
that adverse selection renders such differentiation impossible. The
ACA's requirement that individual market insurers sell coverage to
any willing buyer means that "patients can switch plans when they
become sick," and therefore, "plans with more-comprehensive cover55 Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 25-29).
56 BAGLEY FT AL., supra note 10. Bagley and Frakt also authored a 2017 article analyzing
content choice. See Austin B. Frakt & Nicholas Bagley, Why It's So Hard for Insurers to Compete
Over Technology, 318 JAMA 687 (2017).
57

BAGLEY FT AL., supra note 10, at 5.

58

Id. at 7.

59 Id. at 17.
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age would be likely to attract less-healthy patients, which would in
turn lead premiums for those generous plans to skyrocket." 60 They
provide the following illustration:
Consider, for example a young, married couple with no children with a modest demand for technology, both because
they're healthy and because they value exotic vacations more
than exotic treatments. They select the low-technology (high
cost-effectiveness) option and use the savings to travel
abroad. Now suppose that they have a child who needs treatment for cystic fibrosis. Novel therapies for this condition
have an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars. The family may rationally want to
switch from their plan with stingy coverage rules to an expansive plan that covers high-cost therapies with low costeffectiveness. 61
Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt review and ultimately reject three
proposals for stemming adverse selection-allowing the denial of coverage for preexisting conditions, risk adjustment, and permitting the
sale of multiyear plans-arguing that allowing plans to consider preexisting conditions is contrary to the core ideals of the ACA, risk adjustment is unworkable, and multiyear plans would stifle
competition. 62 They conclude that "allowing health plans to compete
on the scope of what technologies they cover . .. would require regulations that are unlikely ever to be politically and culturally attractive," 63 and that "[d]irect competition between plans that cover
technology to different levels of cost-effectiveness appears to be a
nonstarter, closer to science fiction than plausible policy." 64
Although their concerns have merit, their verdict is overstated.
As they concede, plans already differ in actuarial value, choice of provider, and network breadth. 65 These differences all present opportunities for adverse selection, but do not undermine implementability.
While choice about content presents similar dangers, adding regulated
choice about content to the existing mix of choices represents a difference of degree rather than kind. Furthermore, choice about content
may not raise the overall risk of adverse selection if it substitutes for
other forms of choice, such as actuarial value or network breadth,
60

Id. at 8.

Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
Id. at 7-10.
63 Id. at 2.
64 Id. at 17.
65 See id. at 9.
61

62
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rather than adding to them. Parts III, IV, and V will emphasize the
idea that choice about content can replace other, less valuable, forms
of choice, expanding the value of choice to purchasers without creating the downsides of excessive options.
Additionally, Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt's proposals for addressing health care costs and misaligned incentives for innovation-replacing the tax exclusion of employer-based insurance with a credit,
strengthening Medicare coverage determinations, and allowing reference pricing for some treatments in Medicare 66-face their own political headwinds. The tax exclusion of employer-based insurance is
politically entrenched, 67 and their proposed reforms to Medicare
would require federal legislative action and make the government the
scapegoat when treatments are excluded from Medicare coverage or
made unavailable because of reference pricing. 68 They would also require the government to set cost-effectiveness thresholds, a task
fraught with both political and legal problems. 69 In contrast, this Article's proposal has the political advantage of making insurance purchasers, rather than the government, responsible for the decision to
exclude treatments from coverage. Making cheaper treatment a
choice rather than a top-down imposition has both political and legal
advantages.
The remainder of this Section considers five prior proposals 70 for
content choice, two of which are the focus of Bagley, Chandra, and
Frakt's critique. 71 These proposals emphasize different aspects of content choice. Some of these proposals are advanced by scholars-Mark
Pauly, Arti Rai, Einer Elhauge, and Zeke Emanuel-who have spent
time in government as well as academia. Pauly is described as conservative and advised the George H.W. Bush administration in the
66

Id. at 11-16.

67 Alex Muresianu & Nicole Kaeding, Another Look at Reforming the Health Insurance
Exclusion, TAx

FOUND.

(June 27, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/another-look-at-reforming-

the-health-insurance-exclusion/

[https://perma.cc/4AM7-WQKH];

Kate Zernike, The Hidden

Subsidy That Helps Pay for Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/07/07/health/health-insurance-tax-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/7KR8-8HQG].
68 See Margot Sanger-Katz, Another of Obamacare's Unloved Provisions Is Gone, N.Y.
TIMES

(Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/upshot/obamacare-ipab-medicare-

congress.html [https://perma.cc/CU65-ATWJ].
69 See generally Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable

Care Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119 (2015) (discussing legal and political challenges in the implementation of traditional cost-effectiveness analysis).
70

See infra Table 1 for a summary of each proposal.

71 See BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 (critiquing Korobkin's and Pauly's proposals).
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1990s,72 while Emanuel, Elhauge, and Rai all worked for the Obama
campaign or administration, with Emanuel having a major role in the
development of the ACA. 73 That academics fluent in policy have expressed openness to the idea of content choice suggests that it is more
than a "science fiction" proposal. 74
2.

Relative-Value Health Insurance

Russell Korobkin, whose work is a primary target of Bagley,
Chandra, and Frakt's critique, observes that plans without content
choice fail to account for "the heterogeneity in preferences for medical care and thus would almost certainly result in significant inefficiencies . . . ."75 He suggests that patients could be offered a choice
between different forms of "relative value health insurance (RVHI), a
product that would cover medical interventions that meet or exceed a
given level of cost-effectiveness and exclude from coverage relatively
less cost-effective treatments." 7 6 According to Korobkin, "RVHI
could be offered with different cost-benefit thresholds, enabling consumers with different subjective preferences for allocating their financial resources to medical care versus other goods and services to
satisfy those preferences at the time that they purchase insurance," 77
minimizing the problem of having to make financial trade-offs at the
point of treatment.
As Korobkin observes, the "consequence" of medical necessity is
that "all buyers of private health insurance must purchase 'Cadillac'72 Ezra Klein, An Interview with Mark Pauly, Father of the Individual Mandate, WASH.
POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2011/02/aninterview_

with_mark_pauly_t.html [https://perma.cc/F25T-XSFE].
73 Michael Rainey, Ezekiel Emanuel: Obamacare Has Saved Over $2 Trillion so Far, FisCAL TIMES

(Mar. 25, 2019) (noting that Emanuel was "one of the architects of the Affordable

Care Act in the Obama administration"), https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2019/03/25/EmanuelObamacare-Has-Saved-Over-2-Trillion-So-Far

[https://perma.cc/RPV5-M45N]; Guy Rolnik,
Horizontal Shareholding, Antitrust, Growth and Inequality, PROMARKET (July 1, 2016), https://
promarket.org/horizontal-shareholding-antitrust-growth/?mc_cid=7d82c41321&mc_eid=08df55
fd49 [https://perma.cc/XM5Q-S5MY] (explaining that Elhauge "was chairman of the Antitrust
Advisory Committee to Barack Obama's 2008 campaign"); Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out 'PatentTrolls', N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/
05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.html

[https://perma.cc/6RAN-5GU5]

("Ms.

Rai . . . was the administrator for the Office of External Affairs at the patent office.").
74 But see BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 17 (deriding content choice as "science
fiction").
75 Russell Korobkin, Relative Value Health Insurance, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 417,

419 (2014).
76 Id. at 420.
77 Id. at 421.
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quality health care at a Cadillac price, even if they would prefer to
purchase a more modest level of care at a more modest price."78
Korobkin identifies insurance purchasers' unwaivable right to treatment judged "medically necessary" as the most obvious obstacle to
RVHI.79 He notes, however, that external medical necessity review
could be avoided by explicitly excluding some treatments from the
health insurance contract.8 0 Korobkin suggests that cost-effectiveness
data could be used to generate multiple "levels" of plans, with Level
10 plans including interventions with all levels of cost-effectiveness
while Level 1 plans include only treatments with high costeffectiveness.81
Korobkin proposes resolving the adverse selection objection that
Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt identify through precommitment, at least
for some period of time, suggesting that "if a customer purchased a
Level 3 policy and then switched to a more generous Level 8 policy,
he would be covered for interventions rated 8 or higher for any new
conditions but only for interventions rated 3 or higher for preexisting
conditions." 82 Anticipating the concerns Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt
raise, Korobkin notes that "this rule would not undermine the ACA's
philosophy that all Americans should be able to purchase reasonably
priced health insurance regardless of their health status." 83 While
Korobkin's precommitment proposal could address Bagley, Chandra,
and Frakt's concern about sicker patients jumping to more costly
plans, especially if patients are required to commit for a substantial
time, Part III argues that regulating the content of plans and limiting
customers' ability to switch plan types does much of the same work.
3.

Limiting Coverage of New Technology

Mark Pauly's proposal for content choice focuses on why health
insurance does not offer plans with lower premiums and less access to
high-cost treatments, and argues that offering such plans might motivate research and development investment in less effective but less
expensive treatments. Pauly notes that currently, "[p]eople cannot
generally choose knowledgeably among a variety of plans characterized by explicitly different policies toward new technology." 8 4 This is
78 Id. at 424.
79 See id. at 422.
80 Id. at 424-25.
81

See id. at 427.

Id. at 434.
Id.
84 Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1523, 1528 (2005).
82
83
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because "plans in most markets do not say much about their technology-rationing policies . . . and, as far as we know, health plans are
fairly similar in terms of coverage of new technology." 8 5 Pauly observes that proposals for innovation in health care tend to focus on the
desire to produce higher quality at lower cost, rather than recognizing
the desirability of offering treatment that is lower in both quality and
cost. 86
Pauly argues that increased affordability will require a "legal system that allow[s] consumers to opt out of the best possible improvements in care (regardless of cost) for a less aggressive alternative."87
Like Korobkin, Pauly suggests that choice-differentiated plans could
use cost-effectiveness thresholds, either in the form of fixed thresholds
or thresholds that vary from year to year in order to keep spending
constant. 88 He also suggests two other plan designs: a plan that "delay[s] new technology," and a "'no new heroic measures' health plan,"
which limits spending specifically on end-of-life care. 89 Part II examines similar suggestions.
Pauly considers several potential reasons why current plans do
not offer content choice. He rejects liability for failing to provide medically necessary care as the explanation, because plans can avoid liability by explicitly specifying what treatments are excluded. 90 Instead, he
focuses on providers' potential unwillingness to participate in plans
with limits and patients' movement from year to year between insurers. 91 He also discusses adverse selection, noting the worry that
"higher risks would be more likely to choose plans that add technology more rapidly, so that any resulting adverse selection would drive
out those 'inflationary' plans compared with ones with slow premium
growth that are reluctant to add expensive but beneficial technology."92 But Pauly-in contrast to Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt and
Korobkin-argues that "although adverse selection could be a reason
85

Id.

86 See Mark V. Pauly, 'We Aren't Quite as Good, But We Sure Are Cheap': Prospects for
Disruptive Innovation in Medical Care and Insurance Markets, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1349, 1350
(2008). Pauly asks, "Why does not some insurer offer a health plan with premiums that grow less
rapidly because of slower take-up of costly but beneficial innovations? Why not push a scan with
a little less accuracy but much lower cost? What about a lower-price drug with more uncomforta-

ble side effects?" Id.
87 Id. at 1352.
88 See Pauly, supra note 84, at 1532.
89 Id. at 1533.
90 Id. at 1528-29.
91

See id. at 1529.

92 Id.
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for the existence of a smaller variety of plans than would occur in its
absence, it does not seem to be a plausible explanation for what is
happening with technology and spending growth." 93 Drawing on his
background in economics, Pauly instead emphasizes that sellers often
cluster their offerings "too 'close together' in an effort to appeal to
the median consumer rather than reaching a niche. 94
4.

Rationing Through Choice

The analyses of content choice that Korobkin, Pauly, and Bagley,
Chandra, and Frakt offer are all prompted by the problems in health
insurance affordability immediately before and after the ACA's passage, as discussed in Part I. But interest in content choice substantially
predates the ACA.
In a 1997 article, Arti Rai proposes what she calls "rationing
through choice," an approach that allows patients to opt out of expensive treatments in advance. 95 She identifies two reasons why rationing
through choice is preferable to the development of a universal standard for which interventions should be offered. First, ethical considerations underdetermine the appropriate standard. 96 Second, setting a
universal standard through a democratic process unfairly disadvantages individuals with atypical preferences. 97 Under Rai's approach,
like Korobkin's, individuals seeking insurance would have access to a
variety of different insurance plans that covered or excluded certain
interventions, with the main differentiator being cost-effectiveness. 98
Rai, like most of the scholars discussed above, is concerned about
the prospect of adverse selection.99 But rather than embracing a limited preexisting condition exclusion, as Korobkin does,1 00 Rai attempts
to address adverse selection through risk adjustment that would provide sicker patients a greater quantity of resources to select their preferred plan.101 Rai also proposes limitations on the content of
available plans, but her limitations face problems. One such limitation
is a prohibition on making "ex ante rationing choices that contem93

94

Id.
Id. at 1530.

95 Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Anal-

ysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1021 (1997).
96 See id. at 1030-31.
97 See id.
98

Id.

99

See id. at 1043.

at

1018-19.

100 See Korobkin, supra note 75, at 434.
101

Rai, supra note 95, at 1043.
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plate[ ] very serious and irreversible deprivations of liberty,"102 which
would seem to rule out decisions to ever deny oneself lifesaving treatment in the future, given that death is an irreversible deprivation of all
goods, including liberty. She also proposes prohibiting buyers from
binding themselves to a plan more than three to five years in the future.1 03 This is hard to accept, as Part IV will discuss, given that we
allow individuals to substantially constrain their own futures by electing or refusing major medical procedures, and also allow people to
make other major decisions that constrain their futures, such as decisions to become a parent, join the military, marry, or assume debts.
5.

Precommitment to Content Choice

In a 1994 article, Einer Elhauge offers qualified praise for content
choice. He argues that decisions to deny access to certain treatments
that "rely[] on the prior consent of those denied care . . . send[] the
message that society considers each individual's choices important."o4
His main concerns are whether individuals should be held to their past
commitments,'105 and under what conditions commitments should be
made.106

Like Rai, Elhauge worries about individuals' capacity to bind
themselves in the future. But, as discussed above, no special justification is needed for a young adult to be able to bind herself to a marriage or a mortgage, nor is any particular solicitude for the plight of a
"future self" warranted in these cases. It is doubtful that decisions
about health care should be treated differently. Elhauge asks the
question, "when should we respect the exercise of past autonomy over
the present?"1 07 One potential answer is, "Whenever the exercise of
past autonomy created a genuine commitment." Respect for commitments does not require rendering them irrevocable-the law includes
mechanisms for people to leave marriages or stop paying mortgages,
although exercising these mechanisms typically comes with major
costs-but the ability to bind oneself to long-term plans is part of the
autonomy that Elhauge recognizes as valuable. 08 Elhauge also dis102
103
104
105

Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1038-39.
Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1526 (1994).
See id. at 1527-29; see also Rai, supra note 95, at 1038 (echoing this concern).

Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1530-35.
107 Id. at 1528.
108 See id. at 1526 ("[T]he most powerful reason for designing a health care system that
106

permits a diversity of moral choice [is] the moral significance of respecting individual auton-

omy.");

see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventional-
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cusses the risk of adverse selection, and notes that ill people might
self-select into plans that allocate more resources to expensive lifesaving treatment.1 09 Like Rai, he suggests risk adjustment as a solution,110 but his analysis is also compatible with the Affordable Choices
approach's regulation of plan content. And Elhauge recognizes the
difference between choosing a plan based on one's health status and
choosing a plan based on the value one assigns to health care,"' a
topic that Part III discusses.
6.

Community Health Programs

In a 1991 book, Ezekiel Emanuel suggests allowing individuals to
choose from an expansive menu of different "community health programs" ("CHPs").112 Unlike Korobkin and Pauly, who favor content
choice primarily because it improves affordability for buyers and incentivizes socially valuable innovation, Emanuel's justification for
content choice emphasizes the ability to shape one's life. Members of
each CHP would together "articulate the broad outlines of their
shared conception of the good life,"" 3 and would include coverage for
interventions that fit that conception. CHP members would also determine what proportion of the CHP's resources should be devoted to
various treatments, such as "nursing home care, drugs, bone marrow
transplants, dialysis for patients over age 65, or clinical research."" 4
CHP participants would also determine the criteria for provision of
the offered treatments.1 5 This structure makes CHP participants "citizen-members" who "are responsible for deciding various aspects of
the CHP's policies, ranging from what services will be provided to
what informed consent procedures will exist."11 6 Emanuel emphasizes
that participation in a CHP enables members to collectively shape
their lives: they are "not just recipients of services conceived and administered by others, but participating citizens determining the health
ism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 502 (2008) ("An autonomous life requires ...

meaningful, moral

relations with others. Meaningful, moral relations depend on agents having the ability to make
binding promises."). But see Aditi Bagchi, Contractand the Problem of Fickle People, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) ("The same ideal of moral agency that makes promise valuable
makes the power to revise and reject commitments that we have made valuable too.").
109 Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1533.

110 Id. at 1534.
111 See id. at 1535.
112 EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL,
113 Id. at 179.
114 Id. at 181.

115 See id. at 180-81.
116 Id. at 183.
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care policies they will receive."117 Although all citizens receive a
voucher that funds the CHP of their choice, CHPs can choose to refund some of the voucher funds to their members or to impose additional assessments on their members to fund more costly
treatments.11 8 The sets of services offered in CHPs could vary substantially, just as conceptions of the good life do.119
Although Emanuel does not provide a detailed analysis of adverse selection, he does propose strategies for combating it. First, the
only criteria CHPs are permitted to use in determining who may enroll are those that reflect the CHP's conception of the good life,120 and
CHPs are prohibited from selecting or excluding participants on the
basis of health status.121 Second, CHP vouchers include risk adjustment by age, with older enrollees receiving larger vouchers, in order
to deter CHPs from excluding older enrollees who are likely to need
more treatment.1 22 Third, movement between CHPs would be restricted, with efforts made to prevent patients from selecting CHPs on
the basis of their anticipated health care needs rather than on the basis of their conception of the good life.1 23 Part III builds on the first
and third of these strategies in particular by discussing how the Affordable Choices framework would resist adverse selection.

117

Id.

118 Id. at 185, 190.
119 See id. at 212-18.
120 Id. at 184.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 187.
123 Id. at 190-91.
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Proposal
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Insurance12 4

Russell
Korobkin

5

Description of
Plan(s)
10 plan "levels"
varying by costeffectiveness

Mark Pauly Cost-effectiveness
threshold

Various12
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Delayed access to
new technology

Distinctive Features of
Proposal
Combats adverse selection
through precommitment

Dismisses adverse selection
as an unlikely major
problem

Limits certain costly
end-of-life treatments
Rationing
Through
Choice12 6

Arti Rai

Multiple costeffectiveness

Combats adverse selection
through risk adjustment

thresholds

Emphasizes individual
autonomy
Limits precommitment

Allocating Health
Care Morally12 7

Community
Health
Programs12 8

Einer
Elhauge

Ezekiel
Emanuel

Cost-effectiveness
threshold

Combats adverse selection
through risk adjustment

Excludes costly endof-life treatments

Emphasizes individual
autonomy

Collectively chosen
packages of
treatments

Combats adverse selection
through risk adjustment
Emphasizes community
choice
Limits movement between
plans

II.

AFFORDABLE CHOICES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE

This Part presents a positive proposal for content differentiation:
the Affordable Choices approach. Section II.A begins by explaining
the normative underpinnings of the Affordable Choices approach, and
how it can improve affordability and autonomy while resisting adverse
selection. Section II.B outlines some categories of plans that might be
offered within an Affordable Choices framework. Section II.C pro124

See Korobkin, supra note 75; see also infra Section I.D.2 (discussing Korobkin's

proposal).
125 See Pauly, supra note 86; Pauly, supra note 84; see also infra Section I.D.3 (discussing
Pauly's proposal).
126 See Rai, supra note 95; see also infra Section I.D.4 (discussing Rai's proposal).
127 See Elhauge, supra note 104; see also infra Section I.D.5 (discussing Elhauge's
proposal).
128

See EMANUEL, supra note 112; see also infra Section I.D.6 (discussing Emanuel's

proposal).
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vides a thumbnail sketch of how Affordable Choices plans could be
offered on an existing ACA exchange, and also discusses how they
could be offered as employer-based, Medicare, or Medicaid plans.
Section II.D discusses the legal provisions that enable Affordable
Choices plans to be offered as part of individual market and employer-based insurance, and the legal changes that would be necessary
in order to offer them as part of Medicare and Medicaid.
A.

Principlesfor Plan Construction

The Affordable Choices approach retains the core values that animate the ACA-guaranteed access for people with preexisting conditions, subsidies for poorer households, provision of preventive care at
no out-of-pocket cost, and restrictions on differential pricing.1 29 But it
abandons the one-size-fits-all vision of insurance content often associated with the ACA's essential health benefits130 in favor of giving purchasers a broader range of choices.
As noted earlier, the Affordable Choices framework would offer
regulated, not unbounded, choice. This Section explains four ways
that it would regulate choice: reasonabledisagreement, health-neutral
appeal, preventing harm to others, and achieving monetary savings.
1.

Reasonable Disagreement

The interventions excluded from Affordable Choices plans
should be ones about which reasonable disagreement exists. Indicia of
reasonable disagreement might include physicians deciding not to provide a given intervention, patients electing not to receive it, recommendations against it by expert bodies such as Choosing Wisely or the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force,'131 its exclusion from reimbursement or approval by private or public insurers within the United
States, or its exclusion by health systems in other developed countries.
The reasonable disagreement principle helps forestall two dangers discussed in Parts III and IV: that a plan will be unfair to the sick or an
unreasonable choice for purchasers.
As Section II.B explains, the reasonable disagreement principle
supports the availability of "international reference coverage" plans,
129 See Maher, supra note 20, at 144-46.
130 See Amy B. Monahan, The Regulatory Failure to Define Essential Health Benefits, 44
AM. J.L. & MED. 529, 531 (2018) (explaining that all ACA marketplace plans "must cover the
same bundle of treatments and services, known as the Essential Health Benefits").
131 See David Liebovitz, Meaningful EHR Attributes for an Era of Accountability, Trans-

parency, Shared Decision Making, and Value Assessment, 34 J.

LEGAL MED.

43, 46 (2013).
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which are plans that would provide the set of interventions offered in
other developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, Taiwan, Germany, or Canada. The reasonable disagreement principle could also
support offering plans that are based on expert recommendations or
plans that provide the set of interventions that were available five or
ten years ago rather than the newest set of interventions.1 32
2.

Health-Neutral Appeal

Affordable Choices plans should appeal to people on the basis of
their values, rather than their health status.1 33 A plan appeals to buyers on the basis of health status when people believe that they are
unlikely to develop certain medical needs and so select a plan that
excludes treatments for those needs. For instance, individual plans
that exclude pregnancy-related care might appeal to some men.1 34 Permitting men to select such plans is potentially objectionable both because their choice is motivated by expected health status and because
it tracks a legally protected social identity.135 But a plan could also
appeal on the basis of health status without tracking a legally protected identity-for instance, Alaskans (who live outside the range for
Lyme disease) wanting to purchase a plan that excludes Lyme disease
care. In contrast, someone who values other goals more highly than
maximal medical benefit might select a plan that excludes expensive
drugs that are marginally more effective than cheaper alternatives.
This is an example of a choice grounded in values, because the
chooser selects her plan based on her life goals rather than her expected medical needs. Someone who believes that costly treatment after the onset of advanced dementia would not further her life plans,
and therefore selects a plan that excludes such treatment, similarly
selects her plan based on values rather than health status.
A plan that appeals to health status as opposed to values enables
adverse selection: it draws in healthier populations and makes other
132 See Pauly, supra note 84, at 1533 (discussing the possibility of plans that offer slightly
older interventions).
133 See EMANUEL, supra note 112, at 191; Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1535.
134 See Tina Sfondeles, Amid Furor, Shimkus Doesn't Back Off 'PrenatalCare' Remark,

CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017, 8:34 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/3/10/18333949/
amid-furor-shimkus-doesn-t-back-off-prenatal-care-remark [https://perma.cc/8GKU-D3QS] (reporting remarks by Rep. John Shimkus (R-Ill.) that questioned why men should have to pay for
prenatal care).

135 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 ("An Act to
amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy.").
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plans more expensive as their enrollees become sicker.13 6 Perfectly
distinguishing status-based from values-based choice will be difficult,
which means that the adverse selection problems associated with status-based choice must be weighed against the affordability and autonomy gains from allowing values-based choice. For instance, while
some people may choose a reference coverage plan based on the
United Kingdom's National Health Service ("NHS") package of interventions because of health status (for instance, because they will not
need an expensive treatment that the NHS plan excludes), there are
also compelling reasons unrelated to health status to select a plan
based on the NHS. Part III will return to the trade-off between allowing values-based choice and preventing status-based choice.
3.

Preventing Harm to Others

Affordable Choices plans should also protect and promote the
health of non-participants. This principle will generally prioritize
treating communicable diseases. For example, a plan participant's being cured of hepatitis protects third parties by decreasing their risk of
contracting hepatitis.137 This favors including hepatitis C treatments,
even if costly, in Affordable Choices plans. Preventing harm to others
would also prioritize treatments that prevent someone from becoming
a danger to others-for instance, treatments for drug or alcohol dependence and for serious mental health conditions. Treatments that
protect a participant's dependents, such as prenatal care or screening
for postpartum depression, would also be prioritized.
4.

Achieving Monetary Savings

Treatments or treatment categories excluded from Affordable
Choices plans should be those whose exclusion will substantially lower
costs. Excluding cost-neutral treatments will not improve affordability. This is compatible with excluding categories of costly
treatments used by only a few people because this type of broad exclusion can lower costs even if no single instance makes a major difference on its own.1 38

136 See Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1533.
137 See infra Section V.B.
138 See Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1467-68.
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Plan Options

The principles described in Section II.A suggest that several plan
types could be offered within an Affordable Choices framework.1 39
These include international reference coverage plans,'1 4 0 which provide
only the interventions covered by another country or locality; historic
reference coverage plans, which provide only the interventions that
were offered at some point in the past (except where a newer treatment is cheaper); cost-effectiveness plans, which provide only treatments that meet a specified cost-effectiveness threshold; evidencebased plans, which exclude treatments that are not recommended by
expert bodies; and advance directive plans, which exclude specific
treatments (often at the end of life) that some purchasers may not
value. Table 2 summarizes each of these possible plans and provides
real life examples as well as treatments that are excluded from each
plan.

See infra Table 2.
140 My use of the term "reference coverage" to describe a health plan based on the services
139

offered in other developed countries is meant to parallel "reference pricing," the pricing of treatments based on their price in other developed countries. See William V. Padula, State and FedPOL'Y 15, 22 (2019).

CARE

L.

&

eral Policy Solutions to Rising Prescription Drug Prices in the U.S., 22 J. HEALTH
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TYPES OF AFFORDABLE CHOICES PLANS

Type

Examples

Excluded Interventions

International
reference
coverageplans

United Kingdom plan141
New Zealand plan1 42

Some costly and/or ineffective
treatments

Historic
reference
coverageplans

Plans based on interventions
available in 2010 or 2000

Newer, costly treatments

Costeffectiveness
plans

"Rationing Through Choice"

proposal (Rai)1 43

All treatments above cost-

effectiveness threshold

"Relative Value Health
Insurance" proposal

(Korobkin)1 44
Evidence-based
plans

Plans based on Choosing Wisely
or U.S. Preventive Services Task
Force recommendations145

Treatments that lack an
evidence base or are not
recommended by expert
bodies

Advance
directiveplans

Plans based on proposals by
Ronald Dworkin1 4 6 or Daniel
Callahan147

All life-extending treatment
for patients with dementia
(Dworkin) or beyond a
certain age (Callahan).

International reference coverage plans best satisfy the principles
in Section II.A. Because they appeal to a broad population, the interventions they exclude can be thought of as automatically subject to
reasonable disagreement-because the exclusion list has been democratically vetted by reasonable decisionmakers-and the interventions
excluded also contribute to substantial cost savings. The list of developed countries whose marketing authorizations can be used for drug
exports could be used to define the list of reference coverage offer-

141 See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
142 See infra text accompanying note 153.
143 See Rai, supra note 95.
144 See supra text accompanying note 131.
145 See Korobkin, supra note 75.
146 See Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, 41 N.Y. REV. BooKs 20 (Jan. 13,

1994), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1994/01/13/will-clintons-plan-be-fair/

[https://perma.cc/

ECS7-6JYT] [hereinafter Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?];Ronald Dworkin, Justice in the
Distributionof Health Care, 38

MCGILL

L.J. 883, 891 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, Justice in the

Distribution of Health Care].
147 See Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, supra note 146; Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 146, at 891.
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ings,1 48 paralleling a similar proposal to use that list to determine reciprocity in drug approval.1 49
International reference coverage could generate large savings.
For example, a 2019 Journalof General InternalMedicine article documented that Medicare spent $17.8 billion on medications that Ontario's Drug Benefit Formulary excludes.1 50 Medicare's Part D
prescription drug program covers approximately 40 million beneficiaries, which equates to spending of more than $400 per beneficiary.151 Medicare also spent several billion dollars on drugs approved in
Canada, but not in Australia or England.15 2 Other nations, like New
Zealand, similarly use formularies to control drug pricing, resulting in
New Zealanders having access to fewer and older medications, but
also enjoying per capita spending on pharmaceuticals that is more
than three times lower.1 53 Savings are also possible on treatments
other than pharmaceuticals. The United Kingdom limits access to
treatments that are not cost-effective, including treatments that have
potential benefit but that are very costly, such as some cancer treatments,'1 54 and treatments with low or uncertain benefits, such as knee
arthroscopies for arthritis and injections for non-specific back pain.1 55
148 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.110(b)(2) (2019) (permitting export of investigational new drugs
that have "valid marketing authorization in Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa, or in any country in the European Union or the European Economic
Area," and comply with other requirements).
149 See Reciprocity Ensures Streamlined Use of Lifesaving Treatments Act of 2019, S. 2161,
116th Cong. § 2 (2019); Derek Lowe, ReciprocalApproval of Drugs, According to Ted Cruz and

Mike Lee, AAAS (Dec. 15, 2015), https://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2015/12/15/recip
rocal-approval-of-drugs-according-to-ted-cruz-and-bill-lee

[https://perma.cc/XAC5-N8ZE]

(describing legislation sponsored by Sens. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Mike Lee (R-UT) that would
require the FDA to rapidly approve or refuse treatments that have been approved in other
developed countries); cf Speeding Access to Already Approved Pharmaceuticals Act of 2015,

H.R. 1455, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (using European Union approval as a trigger for FDA expedited review of new treatments).
150 Alexander C. Egilman et al., Medicare Spending on Drugs and Biologics Not Recommended for Coverage by International Health Technology Assessment Agencies, 34 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.

2319, 2320 (2019).

151 See id. at 2319.
152 See id. at 2320.
153 See Rajan Ragupathy et al., A 3-Dimensional View of Access to Licensed and Subsidized
Medicines Under Single-Payer Systems in the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, 30
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1051, 1054, 1059-60, 1061 (2012).
154 See Suzanne Elvidge, NHS England Cuts Treatments from Cancer Drugs Fund, PHARMACEUTICAL J. (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/nhs-

england-cuts-treatments-from-cancer-drugs-fund/20069298.article
155 NHS England to Stop 'Ineffective' Treatments, BBC

[https://perma.cc/PS3J-H3ZT].

NEWS

.bbc.com/news/health-44665560 [https://perma.cc/SXF8-R3NT].

(June 30, 2018), http://www

2020]

CHOOSING AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE

849

Historic reference coverage plans, cost-effectiveness plans, and
evidence-based plans can also satisfy the principles in Section II.A,
but present a greater risk of enabling excessive adverse selection or
overwhelming choosers with excessive choices. Advance directive
plans that exclude specific interventions, particularly end-of-life treatments, are likely to be the most controversial. Although reasonable
people disagree about whether end-of-life treatments fit with their life
goals, people may also select plans that exclude certain end-of-life
treatments because of differences in predicted health status, rather
than differences in values. The legal and political challenges in distinguishing values-based plans from plans that appeal to people on the
basis of health status, as Part III will discuss further, make them a
lower priority for inclusion.
C.

Affordable Choices on an ACA Exchange

The Affordable Choices framework is agnostic about the mechanism by which insurance is offered. As Section II.D explains, Affordable Choices plans could be offered in the ACA's individual
marketplace as employer-based insurance, or within government-provided insurance like Medicare and Medicaid. This Section discusses
how Affordable Choices plans could be added to an individual marketplace, using Colorado's exchange as an example.
As they do currently, prospective purchasers would list various
facts that affect ACA premiums, such as date of birth, zip code,
county, and income, which determines eligibility for subsidies.15 6 Some
Exchanges, like Colorado's, then ask about the purchaser's medical
needs in order to help them identify the best balance of premiums
versus copayments and deductibles, and allow the purchaser to see
whether their doctor is in network and whether the plan includes the
medications that they use.1 57 An Exchange could incorporate Affordable Choices plans by asking whether the purchaser would like to see
plans that may be more affordable but that exclude some treatments.
Purchasers who agree would be provided with a checkbox to include
various types of Affordable Choices plans. For purchasers who view
Affordable Choices plans, the list of plan options would include an
additional column (next to "Coverage of my doctors and medications") for "Coverage of treatments," explaining that the plan in ques156 See Quick Cost and Plan Finder, CONNECT FOR HEALTH COLO., https://planfinder.con
nectforhealthco.com/input-your-information
157 See id.

[https://perma.cc/4DZ6-XWG9].
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tion does not cover all treatments. The summary plan description
would explain more fully which treatments are excluded.
Adding Affordable Choices plans could increase the number of
available choices and thereby raise cognitive burdens on participants,
an objection discussed in Part IV.158 But current exchanges already
include many more plans than is optimal from a cognitive burden perspective; for example, there are 45 plans available to participants in
Denver.1 59 Affordable Choices plans could even simplify the process
of selecting a plan, if they used savings from offering fewer costly
treatments to offer low or zero deductibles and out-of-pocket
maximums.
D.

The Legality of Affordable Choices

This Section discusses what legal changes, if any, would be
needed to enable Affordable Choices plans to be offered as part of
ACA marketplace, employer-based, and government-provided
insurance.
1.

ACA Marketplaces

The Affordable Choices framework is compatible with most
ACA regulations on individual and small-group marketplace insurance. Like current ACA marketplace plans-and unlike short-term or
association plans-Affordable Choices plans would be required to
cover preexisting conditions, could not have lifetime or annual caps,
would require an acceptable medical loss ratio, and could only differentiate pricing based on certain allowable factors such as age, location, and tobacco use.1 60
The only potential source of tension between the Affordable
Choices framework and the ACA regulatory scheme is the ACA's requirement that marketplace plans provide essential health benefits
("EHBs"). But even here, the ACA has been interpreted to give
states substantial discretion to decide which benefits are essential by
selecting a "benchmark plan"-that is, a plan whose benefits serve as
a blueprint for other plans offered on the state exchange.161 While Af158 See Monahan, supra note 130, at 531 (explaining that essential health benefits "serve
consumer-oriented goals by . . . providing individuals with a simplified shopping experience
through plans that each cover the same treatments and services").
159 See Quick Cost and Plan Finder, supra note 156.
160 See Maher, supra note 20, at 144-46.
161 Govind Persad & Harald Schmidt, Sufficiency, Comprehensivenessof Health Care Coverage, and Cost-Sharing Arrangements in the Realpolitik of Health Policy, in WHAT Is ENOUGH?
273, 279-80 (Carina Fourie & Annette Rid eds., 2016); Monahan, supra note 130, at 540 (noting
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fordable Choices plans could not exclude entire classes of EHBs, the
exclusion of some drugs or treatments in a class, or higher deductibles
and copayments for specific treatments would all be consistent with
the EHB requirement.1 62 In 2020, states gained even more discretion
to choose the benchmark plan on which essential health benefits are
based, so long as the plan is at least equivalent in overall scope to a
"typical employer plan."1 63 Furthermore, insurers are permitted to
substitute "actuarially equivalent" packages of benefits both within a
given category and across categories, which permits Affordable
Choices plans to offer an actuarially equivalent, but not identical,
package of treatments.1 64 Alternatively, new guidance from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services permits states to seek permission from the federal government to offer plans that do not cover
the essential health benefits package defined by the ACA, and use
federal funding to subsidize enrollees in these plans.1 65 This represents
an alternative, but more controversial, pathway toward offering Affordable Choices plans.
2.

Employer-Based Insurance

Plans that exclude certain interventions are already being offered
as employer-based insurance. For example, Bind Benefits, an "on-demand health insurance" startup, offers plans with zero deductibles and
low copayments for "primary care and specialist visits, maternity coverage, hospital care, [and] medications."1 66 Bind does not sell insurthat the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' interpretation of essential health benefits "did not involve a nationally-defined set of EHBs ...

, but instead adopted a state-based

approach").
162 See Monahan, supra note 130, at 538-39, 542. Unlike Medicare Part D formularies,
which must cover all pharmaceuticals in certain classes, individual marketplace plans are only
required to cover the same number of drugs in each category and class that the state's "benchmark plan" covers, so long as the plan covers at least one drug per class. Valerie A. Hutchins et
al., Analyzing the Affordable Care Act: Essential Health Benefits and Implications for Oncology,
9 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 73, 76 (2013).
163 See Katie Keith, Unpacking the Final2019 Payment Notice (Part1), HEALTH AFE. (Apr.

10, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2018410.631773/ful/ [https://perma.cc/
XTB3-LFWB].
164 Id. ("[I]nsurers can substitute benefits (other than prescription drug benefits) within the
same EHB category and between EHB categories so long as the substituted benefit is actuarially
equivalent to the benefit being replaced.").
165 See Katie Keith, Georgia Releases Broad 1332 Waiver Application, HEALTH AF. (Nov.

5, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191105.878300/ful/
RLS3-KKE9].

[https://perma.cc/

166 Bertha Coombs, Insurance Start-Up Launches On-Demand Health Coverage, CNBC
(June 28, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/insurance-start-up-launches-on-de

mand-health-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/9GTL-W5WC].
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ance itself, but instead works as a benefit administrator for selfinsured employers.1 67 Bind is able to offer low out-of-pocket costs by
excluding specific procedures: to receive knee arthroscopy, for instance, a consumer would pay a fee that depends on the cost of the
procedure, with fees as high as $6,000 for more expensive providers.1 68
As an example, one Bind plan requires separate payment for 31 procedures, mostly elective surgeries, if these procedures are not needed
as part of an emergency.1 69 These fees are categorized as "add-in premiums" to purchase coverage for the excluded procedures, rather
than as standard copayments, in order to sidestep the ACA's out-ofpocket caps.1 70 Bind's product has been selected by several firms, including Fortune 500 firms, and was named Minneapolis' most promising startup in 2018.171
Although Bind's success indicates the appeal of insurance design
that reduces deductibles and copayments through content choice,
Bind has been criticized for discriminating against older or sicker patients who are more likely to need costly, excluded procedures like hip
replacements or arthroscopies.172 In fact, Bind pitches itself as appealing primarily on the basis of health status, rather than values. In contrast, Affordable Choices plans that systematically limit content,
rather than focusing specifically on excluding a few treatments as Bind

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

See 2019 MEDTRONIC BIND ON-DEMAND HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN SUMMARY (2019)

(on file with The George Washington Law Review). This Bind plan was offered to employees at
Medtronic, a prominent medical device firm. See id.
170 See Julie Appleby, New Health Plans Expose the Insured to More Risk, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://khn.org/news/new-health-plans-expose-the-insured-to-more-risk/
[https://perma.cc/UF38-KHA7].
171 Katharine Grayson, Bind Benefits Wins Minnesota's Most Promising Startup Poll, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:52 AM CDT), https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2018/12/18/bind-benefits-wins-minnesotas-most-promising.html

[https://perma.cc/

W9QJ-83P5]; Katharine Grayson, Health Care Startup Bind Boosts Funding Haul to $70M,
Teams with UnitedHealthcare,MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (June 28, 2018, 2:50 PM CDT),
https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2018/06/28/health-care-startup-bind-raises-10mmore-teams.html [https://perma.cc/XXW3-DDUT].
172 Tom Murphy, Startup's On-Demand Health Insurance Draws Attention, NBC CHICAGO
(Dec. 17, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/health/Bind-Startup-On-DemandHealth-Insurance-502954911.html

[https://perma.cc/QQ3Z-KA88]

(reporting

statement

by

"Sabrina Corlette, a research professor at Georgetown's Center on Health Insurance Reforms,"
that Bind's model "gets close to the line if not a little bit over the line of being discriminatory
because

it

would only be people who have certain health conditions that would face higher

premiums").
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does, might allow health insurance costs to track patients' values
rather than their health status.1 73
3.

Medicare

Offering Affordable Choices plans through government-provided
insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid is also possible, but
would require explicit statutory changes. The Medicare Advantage
program, in which private firms contract with Medicare to provide
coverage to eligible beneficiaries,'1 7 4 would be the most natural avenue
for offering Affordable Choices plans. However, Medicare Advantage
plans cannot exclude services that Medicare covers, and Medicare
covers all reasonable and necessary services without regard to cost.1 75
Although Medicare claims the authority to consider costs in determining reasonableness, it does not exercise this authority.17 6 Additionally, its authority is at the program rather than the plan levelMedicare does not claim the authority to permit some plans to exclude a given treatment as unreasonable while allowing other plans to
include it.177 An Affordable Choices Medicare Advantage plan based
on the United Kingdom's list of treatments, for instance, could only
exclude injections for non-specific back pain if these injections were
not reasonable and necessary-and if they were not reasonable and
necessary, they would not be covered under any Medicare plan.
Nicholas Bagley has criticized Medicare's cost-indifference, arguing that it not only costs taxpayers money for no clear benefit, but also
"encourages the development and adoption of expensive treatments
that offer only trivial health benefits over cheaper alternatives."178
Rather than Medicare exercising its claimed authority to consider
costs, Bagley advocates for relaxing "Medicare's statutory commitment to covering a median provider's reasonable costs" in favor of
173 See infra Part III.
174 How Do Medicare Advantage Plans Work?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/
sign-up-change-plans/types-of-medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/how-do-medi
care-advantage-plans-work [https://perma.cc/U5M7-DGWW].
175 Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats:Why Medicare Reform Hasn't Worked, 101 GEO.
L.J. 519, 554 (2013) (observing that Medicare "is unable to consider costs in deciding what to
cover").

176 Id. at 551-52.
177

See id. at 550-51 (explaining that though "the Medicare program issues thousands of

coverage determinations . . . each year," it has no way of enforcing compliance with its
determinations).

178 Id. at 553.
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paying providers "the costs that low-cost benchmark organizations
spend to cover the costs of medically necessary care."1 7 9
As an alternative to Bagley's proposal, Congress could permit
Medicare Advantage plans to cover packages of benefits that are actuarially equivalent to traditional Medicare and that meet the four regulatory principles discussed in Section II.A. This would allow
Affordable Choices plans to provide a more restricted menu of treatments, such as the United Kingdom's list, in exchange for lower premiums, additional insurance (such as dental or long-term care), or
non-health benefits to recipients.
Providing non-health benefits could be a popular change. For example, when cancer patients and their caregivers were asked "which
benefits Medicare should cover for people with cancer in the last 6
months of life," half of respondents were prepared to accept less than
the most expensive level of cancer treatments in exchange for receiving home-based long-term care coverage, more extensive palliative
care than Medicare provides, or cash benefits.180 And only a small minority of participants "chose the maximum level of cancer treatment . . . , even though this level of treatment is commonly provided
by the current Medicare benefit package definition of reasonable and
necessary-at great expense to Medicare and society."181 This finding
is particularly striking given that respondents were much more likely
to benefit from costly cancer treatment than the general public would
be. African-American caregivers and patients were particularly enthusiastic about receiving long-term care, palliative care, or cash benefits,
and lower-income caregivers and patients were enthusiastic about
cash benefits.1 82 Part IV returns to this finding and argues that a onesize-fits-all health insurance regime is likely to unfairly mandate that
society as a whole select what the majority values. This research suggests that an Affordable Choices plan modeled on the United Kingdom's or New Zealand's plan, if it used the savings from providing less
costly cancer treatment to provide monetary rebates or access to longterm care, would appeal to many cancer patients and caregivers, and
might be even more appealing to the general public.

179 Id. at 564.
180 Donald H. Taylor Jr. et al., There Is a Mismatch Between the Medicare Benefit Package

and the Preferences of Patients with Cancer and Their Caregivers, 32 J.
3163, 3164-66 (2014).
181 Id. at 3167.
182 Id. at 3166.

CLINICAL

ONCOLOLGY

CHOOSING AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE

2020]

4.

855

Medicaid

Like Medicare, Medicaid must cover certain services whenever
medically necessary. These include inpatient and outpatient hospital
services, physician services, laboratory services, and X-rays.1 83 Many
states also offer certain benefits, such as prescription drugs, physical
therapy, and hospice, that are not federally required.1 84 Some also allow Medicaid recipients to choose between several different Medicaid

plans. 185
Whether a state could include an Affordable Choices plan as a
Medicaid option depends on how much leeway states have in defining
medical necessity. The reasonable disagreement principle could
strengthen the case for claiming that excluded treatments are not genuinely medically necessary because they are not provided in other developed countries. But the fact that medical necessity is typically
determined by looking to medical practice in the United States may
present an obstacle. Colorado's definition of medical necessity, for instance, incorporates "generally accepted professional standards for
health care in the United States."1 86
Interestingly, Colorado recently revised its medical necessity
standard to retain the United States standard of care, but changed the
cost-effectiveness language to require that the good or service "[i]s
not more costly than other equally effective treatment options" at issue.1 87 This language might provide an entry point to offer Affordable
Choices plans. But, like Bagley's advocacy for using cost-effectiveness
in Medicare, the language would better support the exclusion of medications that are more costly and no more effective from all Medicaid
plans, rather than from only Affordable Choices plans.

If Medicaid did include Affordable Choices plans-which would
require language that permits, but does not require, states to consider
costs when providing Medicaid-these plans could compensate for offering fewer interventions by lowering or eliminating already-low
copayments. But a better alternative would be to offer health benefits
183

Mandatory & Optional Medicaid Benefits,

MEDICAID.GOV,

https://www.medicaid.gov/

medicaid/benefits/mandatory-optional-medicaid-benefits/index.html

[https://perma.cc/W9RS-

67CR].
184

Robin Rudowitz et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid: Setting the Facts Straight,

KAISER FAM. FOUND.

(Mar.

6, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-things-to-

know-about-medicaid-setting-the-facts-straight/
185

[https://perma.cc/T5JN-FC9U].

See Tips for Choosing a Health Plan, N.Y. MEDICAID

CHOICE,

https://www.nymedicaid

choice.com/choose/more-tips-choosing-health-plan [https://perma.cc/MNE3-KQ9X].
186 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2505-10 8.076.1(8) (2019).
187

Id.
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not currently covered, in-kind benefits other than health care, or cash
benefits. One recent study of Medicaid participants found that although they placed the highest value on health coverage, they were
also very interested in neighborhood improvements, job training and
placement programs, education, and assistance with housing.188 In another study, beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program preferred
more extensive dental and vision coverage than the program offered,
and were willing to reduce access to brand-name pharmaceuticals in
order to obtain this coverage.1 89

III.

FAIRNESS TO THE SICK: ADDRESSING ADVERSE SELECTION

While Part II argued that content choice, as provided by Affordable Choices plans, can improve both the affordability of health insurance and the autonomy of buyers, the next few Parts examine whether
content choice is fair by considering both normative arguments and
consequent legal concerns. This Part discusses whether content choice
is fair to the sick, focusing on strategies for forestalling adverse
selection.
As Bagley, Chandra, and Frakt emphasize, insurance offerings
that differ in content are vulnerable to adverse selection, where
healthier people select narrower coverage packages, while sicker people select broader coverage packages that end up being very expensive because of high utilization by a sicker population.190 One major
purpose of health insurance is to enable people to obtain otherwise
cost-prohibitive medical treatments by pooling their risk of incurring
these costly health expenditures. If people who expect to develop a
costly illness are able to selectively choose plans that offer generous
coverage for that illness, the cost of those plans will rise due to high
utilization, which in turn will drive away people who do not expect to
188 See Marion Danis et al., Prioritiesof Low-Income Urban Residents for Interventions to
Address the Socio-Economic Determinants of Health, 21 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1318, 1328 (2010). This study did not give them the option to scale back health insurance
in order to obtain more non-health benefits-insurance was an all-or-nothing decision. See id. at

1323.
189 See Marion Danis et al., The Coverage Priorities of Disabled Adult Medi-Cal Beneficiaries, 17 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 592, 595-96 (2006). This suggests that
poorer patients do not always "buy as much as they can get" by way of health care coverage.
Contra Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 33).
190 BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 8. The concept of adverse selection is often traced to
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,

84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629
(1976) (discussing a similar concept).
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develop the illness in question and do not wish to pay for coverage
they will not use.19' This, in turn, can produce a "death spiral" for
patients with costly diseases, where plans that cover expensive treatments become wholly unaffordable.1 92
At the outset, a traditional economic definition of adverse selection does not distinguish between purchasers who select higher- or
lower-cost plans because of their values and purchasers who select
such plans because of their predicted health needs. But values-based
and status-based purchasers arguably have different normative entitlements to be protected against the effects of adverse selection.193 Norman Daniels has argued that insurance design should prevent
individuals from monetizing their health status.1 94 For example, Daniels's approach would classify individuals' genetic predispositions to
dementia as a factor that should not increase their health care costs.
The simplest way of protecting this individual is to place them in a
common risk pool with individuals without that predisposition, thus
spreading the costs of the predisposition between the lucky and the
unlucky. In contrast, Daniels's approach would not require that individuals who value costly procedures be placed in a common risk pool
with others. It could be fair for such individuals to bear the higher
costs attributable to their values. As discussed in Part II, packages of
benefits can and should be differentially attractive to enrollees whose
values differ, both with respect to the relative importance of different
191

See Daniel J. Hemel, Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL

F. 265, 271 (noting that choice can produce an "adverse selection problem" because "employees
who know they are sick opt into the more generous plans[, while] employees who know they are
healthy opt into the less expensive, high deductible plans").
192 See Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).
193

This is a point of agreement between friends and skeptics of content choice. Compare

Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L.

REV.

395, 399 n.10 (2001) (discussing the "adverse selection that can occur when a

patient with a specific health need seeks the plan that provides the most generous coverage for
that need" and arguing that "[r]ather than arming consumers with the ability to shop to meet a
specific need, the goal should be to offer clear choices between more and less generous plans"),
with Christine Cassel, The Right to Health Care, the Social Contract, and Health Reform in the

United States, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 53, 59 (1994) ("We simply cannot have each individual buying
insurance based only on his or her own health care risks. That is no longer an insurance mechanism-that person may as well pay out of pocket for health care and avoid the extra charges of
the insurance company.").
194 See Norman Daniels, Insurability and the HIV Epidemic: Ethical Issues in Underwriting,
68 MILBANK Q. 497, 507 (1990) ("The design of health-care systems throughout most of the

world rests on a rejection of the view that individuals should have the opportunity to gain economic advantage from differences in their health risks."); see also JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM (2018) (arguing that health differences should not translate into
economic differences).
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health outcomes and the relative importance of health versus other
goods. But they should minimize their differential attractiveness to
enrollees whose current or expected health status differs.
The simplest way of obviating adverse selection is to eliminate
selection altogether, by offering only one insurance plan.1 95 But offering only a single plan sacrifices the autonomy and affordability advantages choice seeks to achieve. Navigating the trade-off between
preventing adverse selection and providing choice involves weighing
different values against one another.1 96 Both preventing adverse selection and providing choice can improve plan affordability. Preventing
adverse selection also ensures that participants with costly illnesses
are subsidized by others. Providing choice, meanwhile, enables participants to tailor their health spending to track what they value, improving participants' well-being while respecting their autonomy.
Determining how much and what sort of choice to provide depends
both on the empirical likelihood that choice will produce adverse selection, and the relative normative importance of these values.
Despite its desire to prevent adverse selection, the ACA permits
substantial choice. Most notably, ACA plans vary in how they balance
premiums against out-of-pocket costs, with "platinum" plans having
the highest premiums but the lowest deductibles and copayments,
"bronze" plans the reverse, and "silver" and "gold" plans in the middle.1 97 ACA plans also vary in network breadth. These differences
open room for cherry-picking (where plans try to attract healthy enrollees and avoid ill ones) and adverse selection (where ill enrollees
gravitate toward specific plans).198 Because the ACA already countenances some risk of adverse selection in exchange for greater choice,
an Affordable Choices approach could improve on the ACA by re195 See William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 241, 274 ("[T]he tendency among private and public

payers to offer enrollees a choice of health plans can subject more expensive, higher-quality
options to adverse selection.").
196 Cf David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance 57
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7176, 1999), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w7176.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB4W-2XH7]

(discussing the trade-off between increased adverse

selection due to competition between plans and improved affordability due to competition).
'97 Sallie Thieme Sanford, Mind the Gap: Basic Health Along the ACA's Coverage Contin-

uum, 17 J. HEALTH

CARE L. & POL'Y 101, 108 (2014) ("Plans will be offered at four 'metal

levels'-bronze, silver, gold and platinum-with progressively higher actuarial values such that
bronze plans would have the lowest premiums but correspondingly higher expected out-ofpocket costs .... ").
198 See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the PatientProtection

and Affordable CareAct, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1610-11 (2011) (discussing "risk classification
by design," where ill and healthy patients are attracted to different plan designs).
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placing some choices the ACA offers-such as those relating to deductibles and copayments-with choices that are more valuable for
autonomy and affordability, but that are not substantially more likely
to permit adverse selection. Put another way, the Affordable Choices
framework would not merely add to the choices available under the
ACA, but would hold the amount of choice constant while making the
available choices more valuable to choosers.

'

As discussed in Section I.D, prior analyses of content choice have
either downplayed the problem of adverse selection,1 99 or tried to address it via risk adjustment or preexisting condition exclusions.200 In
contrast, the Affordable Choices approach limits adverse selection by
regulating the content of and access to Affordable Choices plans.2 0
These regulations include limits on which treatments can be excluded,
limits on when people can choose plans that exclude certain interventions, and limits on who can choose these plans.
A.

Limits on Excluded Benefits

Affordable Choices plans limit adverse selection by requiring that
plans be designed to appeal to purchasers on the basis of values,
rather than on the basis of prior or expected health status.2 0 2 As discussed in Part II, one category of Affordable Choices plans is international reference coverage plans, which offer a package of
interventions based on a different country's health care system.2 03
Such plans would not achieve all of the cost savings of the national
plans on which they are based, mostly because other systems not only
offer fewer interventions but typically pay lower prices for the inter199 See Pauly, supra note 84, at 1529-30; see also Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in

Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1225 (2004) ("[W]hile adverse
selection in insurance markets is clearly a possibility, it is often not the serious problem that it is
taken to be.").
200 See Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1534; Korobkin, supra note 75, at 424; Rai, supra note
95, at 1038; see also Havighurst, supra note 193, at 399 n.10 ("The adverse selection problem can
be ameliorated by, among other things, allowing plans to limit their coverage of 'pre-existing
conditions' .... ").
201 The types of risk adjustment defended by Rai and Emanuel are compatible with an
Affordable Choices framework, though they are not necessary to such a framework.
202 Selecting an appropriate list of benefits is a recognized strategy for limiting adverse
selection. See Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to

Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1803 n.118 (1992) (arguing
that "careful cuts made all along the margin of health care rather than gross categorical exclusions" can reduce the risk that offering choices will generate adverse selection, and that "creativ-

ity

in designing options" might be superior to a standardized package of benefits in achieving

affordability, while avoiding excessive adverse selection).
203 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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ventions that they do offer. 20 4 But an international reference coverage
plan could still offer substantial savings, particularly because its ability
to say no would strengthen its negotiating position. 2 05 Because these
plans serve entire national populations in democratic regimes, they
are not likely to be a pretext for cherry-picking healthy patients or
driving away ill ones, and they are designed by looking to what the
citizens of those nations value.
Cost-effectiveness plans, meanwhile, are less resistant to adverse
selection than reference coverage plans, but are still less likely to appeal to buyers on the basis of health status, because they exclude a
basket of treatments rather than excluding one specific treatment.206
The Affordable Choices plans most vulnerable to adverse selection
are those that allow purchasers to opt out of specific expensive treatments. Consider, for example, prominent legal academic Ronald
Dworkin's suggestion that patients whose dementia has become sufficiently advanced should not receive costly life-prolonging treatments,
but only comfort care. 20 7 While Dworkin envisioned implementing this
as national policy, 20 8 it could also be offered as an Affordable Choices
option that excluded life-prolonging treatments for patients with dementia, or charged higher co-insurance or copayments for such treatments. The availability of such plans could enable people who would
not value life-extending treatment after the onset of advanced dementia to better shape their lives according to their values.20 9 But the
availability of these plans would raise costs for people who assign
higher value to costly, life-prolonging treatments after the onset of
dementia, because others who either do not value these treatments or
do not think they will need them could now opt out of joining the
same risk pool.
204 See John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 254

(2016).
205 See Leah Rand & Govind Persad, Are Medicaid Closed Formularies Unethical?, 21 AM.
MED. Ass'N J. ETHICS 654, 655 (2019) (noting that the ability to say no to certain treatments
"can enable payers to negotiate more effectively with pharmaceutical firms by allowing payers to
credibly threaten to refuse to pay high prices"); Benjamin Sommers & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Massachusetts' Proposed Medicaid Reforms-Cheaper Drugs and Better Coverage?, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 109, 110 (2018).
206 See generally Rai, supra note 95, at 1043 (discussing adverse selection in the context of
cost-effectiveness plans).
207 See Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 146, at 891.
208 See id. at 888 (noting that society "should aim to make collective, social decisions about
the quantity and distribution of health care").
209

Cf id. at 891 (arguing that "the money spent on premiums" for insurance providing

expensive interventions after the onset of dementia "would have been better spent, no matter
what happens, making life before dementia ...

more worth while").
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Offering a plan based on Dworkin's approach as an Affordable
Choices option would defuse the concern that public opinion about
whether to provide life-prolonging treatment after the onset of dementia is sufficiently fractured that reaching societal agreement on a
national list of interventions will be difficult.2 10 The challenge for offering such a plan is distinguishing between the person who is making
a values-based choice-who is committed to forgoing post-dementia
interventions, regardless of whether she will develop dementia-and
the person who opportunistically selects a plan that will exclude costly
interventions if she develops dementia only because she believes she
will never develop dementia in the first place. Whether a Dworkininspired plan should be offered depends both on the prospects for differentiating these two bases for choice and on the relative importance
assigned to autonomy versus the mitigation of bad luck. That is, given
the difficulty of differentiating between value-based and status-based
choices, should we prioritize allowing people to select the plans they
value (at the risk of permitting some status-based choice), or ensuring
that people will be fully compensated for their disadvantageous health
status (at the risk of proscribing some values-based choice)?211
B.

Limits on Movement Between Plans

As well as limiting the types of plans offered, an Affordable
Choices framework would also limit when participants can enter and
leave plans. Limiting movement aims to prevent what Emanuel calls a
medical "conversion": for instance, when a longtime participant in a
plan that excludes life-extending care after the onset of dementia
switches to a plan that includes life-extending care after she learns
that she is highly likely to develop dementia.212
The simplest way of limiting movement is to require individuals
who purchase Affordable Choices plans that exclude certain treatments to precommit to these plans: while they may move between insurers who offer the same plan, they may not move into a plan that
offers more treatments.213 This precommitment approach not only
helps avoid adverse selection, but also can be an important way of
210 See Rai, supra note 95, at 1025 (arguing that individuals' diverse values generate "a
plethora of substantive allocation standards").
211 Cf Leslie Pickering Francis, Moral Principles and Legal Practice, 35 IND. L. REV. 989,
992 (2002) (reviewing DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH (2001)) (discussing
the question of whether to prioritize the avoidance of "false positives" or that of "false negatives" when determining how much deference to give to patients' choices).
See EMANUEL, supra note 112, at 191.
213 See id.
212
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realizing the financial benefit of some Affordable Choices plans. The
savings from not covering expensive post-dementia treatments for a
25-year-old over the next year will be negligible, just as a one-year
mortgage is of limited utility; the real value to the purchaser, for both
mortgage and insurance precommitment, comes from the ability to
bind oneself in the much further future. This means that Affordable
Choices plans might be offered as part of longer-term insurance contracts in order to obtain greater premium savings.214
An alternative way of limiting exit from less comprehensive plans
is an "escrow" model that borrows features from individual retirement
accounts. Participants in Affordable Choices plans would pay the
same premiums as participants in plans that do not limit benefits, but
the difference between that premium and the "true" lower premium
of the Affordable Choices plan would be held in reserve in an interest-bearing account, accessible at retirement or some date to be determined. Participants who want to exit the Affordable Choices plan and
return to a plan without defined limits would forfeit the reserved premiums and accumulated interest.
To minimize adverse selection, choices about entering and leaving
plans should be made at a time when people have little information
about their expected medical needs. Requiring people to make
choices long before they can reliably predict their odds of developing
certain diseases leads to choices that are more likely to reflect value
judgments about what sort of life they want to lead, rather than predictions of their future health. For instance, requiring people to make
decisions about their Alzheimer's disease treatment preferences
before old age will decrease the relevance of health status to those
decisions. This presents a trade-off between minimizing adverse selection and reducing misprediction, a value discussed in Part IV.
Christopher Robertson's proposal allows insured patients to opt
out of treatments for which they are eligible in return for cash payments.2 15 Allowing insured patients to opt out of treatments after they
know they are eligible to receive them has some advantages over this
Article's strategy of having insured patients opt out prior to knowing
their eligibility: for instance, it could avoid some of the concerns about
214 See Wendy Netter Epstein, Private Law Alternatives to the Individual Mandate, 104
MINN. L. REV. 1429, 1476-83 (2020) (discussing "low introductory rates, long-term contracts,
and limited exit rights"). Longer-term plans also have downsides, such as limits on competition
and challenges in establishing proper prices. See EMANUEL, supra note 112, at 185.
215 See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the

Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 945 (2013).
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misprediction that Part IV will discuss. But opting out before eligibility is known allows insurance purchasers to benefit upfront from
lower premiums. It also aligns with other practices, like mortgages,
that allow purchasers to commit in advance to limit their options. And
opting out before eligibility is known is likely to be more effective at
sending a market signal of demand for cheaper interventions.
One objection to combating adverse selection via precommitment
is that improved diagnostic technologies will enable early prediction
of future health status, making it difficult to differentiate between values-based choices and choices based on health status predictions.216
This concern, while real, does not abrogate the potential for timingbased restrictions to help mitigate adverse selection because many
health problems are difficult for even the best technology to predict in
advance. 2 1 7 Even if diagnostics could predict one's risk of heart disease
or stroke, it would be difficult to predict eligibility for artificial nutrition and hydration or long-term ventilation because these interventions can respond to many different conditions. 218 For example,
diagnostics will have a more difficult time predicting the risk of a gunshot wound or an antibiotic-resistant infection than predicting the risk
of a disease with a major genetic component. 219 So long as health status predictions remain imprecise, they will likely not motivate insurance decisions on their own. An individual purchaser who values
expensive, life-sustaining treatment after the onset of dementia but
learns that she lacks genetic risk factors for Alzheimer's disease may
still prefer policies that include life-sustaining treatment after the onset of dementia, given the stakes of the outcome and the degree of
uncertainty that remains.
C.

Limits on Who Is Eligible

Affordable Choices plans that exclude specific, predictable conditions (such as advance directive plans) might still be tenably offered to
certain subsections of the population. For instance, even if
216

Cf Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA.

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 231 (1996) ("[T]he increased knowledge obtained through genetic testing
will pose a threat to the functioning of the insurance mechanism.").
217 See Cassel, supra note 193, at 59 ("None of us can predict our health care needs. Even if
we fully mapped the genetic structure of everyone in the United States, we will still be unable to
fully predict health care risks. Who could have predicted the Hanta virus? Who could have

predicted AIDS?").
218 See Douglas R. Gracey, Options for Long-Term Ventilatory Support, 18 CLINICS CHEST
MED. 563, 563 (1997) (discussing the "number of acute and chronic conditions" that can produce
a need for mechanical ventilation).
219 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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Alzheimer's disease risk prediction becomes extremely accurate, people who test positive for Alzheimer's disease risk factors could still be
offered the option of choosing Affordable Choices plans that exclude
life-extending treatment after the onset of dementia. If Dworkin and
others are right, many people who expect to develop dementia would
still select such plans because they see no value in further extending
their life after the onset of dementia. Limits on eligibility could also be
used for conditions that track identity categories: for instance, plans
that exclude expensive chemotherapies for breast and ovarian cancer
could be made available only to women (in order to prevent the problem of men selecting these plans on the basis of health status), and the
reverse for prostate cancer treatment.2 20
In addition to ex ante limits on eligibility, ex post assessment of
plan entry and exit could help determine whether a plan is appealing
to participants based on health status or based on values. For example,
a specific plan with many individual subscribers who do not have a
common but costly condition provides some evidence that the plan's
appeal is based on expected health status rather than values. 221 This
and the other strategies examined in this Part are unlikely to completely counter insurers' myriad strategies for avoiding purchasers
with costly conditions,222 but taken together they could reduce riskrelated cost differentials substantially, providing roughly, if not exactly, equitable access.

IV.

FAIRNESS TO PURCHASERS: AUTONOMY AND CHOICE

The previous Part addressed the concern that Affordable Choices
plans would permit adverse selection that undermines access to health
insurance for ill people and discussed strategies for reducing adverse
220

This use of sex or race is likely constitutional when genuinely predictive of certain medi-

cal needs. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 446 (9th Cir. 2016) ("It is not difficult to
imagine the existence of a compelling justification [for considering race] in the context of medical treatment."). Recognizing that breast and ovarian cancer are vastly more common among
women, and prostate cancer vastly less so, is compatible with recognizing that breasts, ovaries,
and prostates are not unique to one gender identity. Cf Elizabeth Villarreal, Pregnancy and

Living Wills: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1052, 1053 n.6 (2019) (noting
that "people of various gender identities can become pregnant").
221
Cf Enthoven, supra note 53, at 43 (suggesting the use of exit questionnaires to identify
selection on the basis of health status by insurers). This strategy is complicated by correlations
between values and health status expectations (for example, people who value cost-effectiveness
may tend to be better off economically or engage in healthier behaviors).
222 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An
Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965, 986 (1981) (discussing risk sorting); Jost, supra
note 36, at 480 (reviewing insurers' strategies for risk sorting).
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selection. This Part considers the fear that Affordable Choices plans
will produce bad outcomes for plan purchasers. Section IV.A provides
an overview of the availability and value of choice in the context of
other essential goods. Section IV.B discusses the concern that
choosers will inaccurately predict their future preferences regarding
health care access. Section IV.C considers the risk of "decision fatigue" that choices about health care present. Lastly, Section IV.D discusses whether choosers will suffer harm from being held responsible
for the health or economic outcomes that flow from their choices.
A.

Choice for Essential Non-Health Goods

American society typically gives households substantial control
over purchasing decisions, not only for discretionary purchases, but
also for essential non-health goods like housing, food, clothing, transportation, and education. The standard regulatory arrangement for
these purchases involves (1) quality and safety standards and (2) subsidized provision to households who lack sufficient buying power. Beyond these two types of regulation, households are free to spend more
or less in exchange for more or less generous packages of goods. 223
1.

Food

Federal and state governments set basic standards of food safety
and quality, and prohibit the sale of foods that are tainted or hazardous, even if some consumers would prefer to save money by purchasing these foods.2 2 4 Beyond these limits, purchasers have broad power
to choose, even though some choices are not just prettier or tastier,
but also more healthful or nutritious. For instance, some experts recommend buying organic produce grown without pesticides or herbicides,225 but price-sensitive consumers are still permitted to choose
conventionally grown produce.
223 This policy choice may reflect the insight that enabling individuals to purchase what
they value can be more cost-effective than providing everyone the same good. See Melissa
Hidrobo et al., Cash, Food, or Vouchers? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern
Ecuador, 107 J. DEV. ECON. 144, 154 (2014) (observing that "vouchers" that can be used to
purchase different foods "lead to significantly larger improvements in dietary diversity" and that
direct food provision "is the least cost-effective means of improving food consumption and dietary diversity outcomes").
224 See J.D. Trout, A Restriction Maybe, but Is It Paternalism?Cognitive Bias and Choosing

Governmental Decision Aids, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 455, 461 (2007).
225 Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 650-51 (2010) (discussing "evidence that organic foods have
health benefits").
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The government also subsidizes access to a basic level of food for
households in need. Programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and Children ("WIC") provide
households with, in effect, a voucher to buy food.22 6 These programs
do not require that participants buy the same quality or quantity of
food that wealthier households do. Instead, SNAP permits participating households broad choice about what they buy,2 2 7 and has been
praised for providing this choice 228 and for integrating SNAP recipients into the same food marketplace as non-SNAP recipients.229 WIC
offers less choice than SNAP and excludes certain more costly products-such as organic foods-thereby enforcing, rather than permitting, different standards of quality.230
2.

Housing

'

Housing regulations, like food regulations, include both subsidies
for access and minimum quality standards. States and localities typically require that housing not be infested by vermin, be adequately
heated, and meet certain minimum size and amenity requirements. 2 3
Beyond these basic requirements, however, households have substantial choice. They may choose homes that are old or new, attached or
detached, small or large, or near or far from work. And choice is per226

Mary E. Kennelly et. al., Strengthening Vendor Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program:Are Healthier Foods Within Reach?, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 141,

153 (2013).
227

See VICTOR

OLIVEIRA

ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DESIGN ISSUES IN USDA's SUP-

PROGRAM 41 (2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/86924/err-243.pdf?v=0 [https://perma.cc/UQV6-CKRB] ("SNAP allows participants
PLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE

to make their own food choices based on their own diverse tastes, circumstances, information,
and spending habits.").
228 See Aaron Saiger, What We DisagreeAbout When We Disagree About School Choice,
99 IOwA L. REV. BULL. 49, 56-57 (2014) ("[E]veryone can see why it is better to let SNAP
recipients exercise personal choices among groceries on store shelves than to issue each of them
an identical food basket."); Donna Yellen et al., Hunger in Maine, ME. POL'Y REV., Winter/

Spring 2011, at 140, 141 (describing SNAP as "offering independence, food choice, and
flexibility").
229 See Samuel Estreicher & Clinton G. Wallace, Equitable Health Savings Accounts: Bridg-

ing the Left-Right Divide, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 415-16 (2019).
230 See Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a
Basic Income, 2017 WiS. L. REV. 1189, 1244 n.188 (2017) (explaining the numerous rules applied
to WIC benefits).
231 Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution: Observations on the Im-

plied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE

ROCK

L. REV. 793, 814-16 (2013); John In-

franca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory

Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. &

POL'Y REV.

53, 71 (2014).
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mitted even when it involves tradeoffs with health or other values, as
when a family chooses a higher-crime, more polluted, or less walkable
neighborhood in order to save money or obtain other desired amenities like a larger home or a shorter commute.
In fact, paralleling the concern discussed in Section II.D that requiring all households to purchase the same full-service insurance
package enshrines majority preference as law, mandated minimum
housing sizes have been criticized for imposing arbitrary cultural values on homeowners and renters who would reasonably prefer smaller
dwellings. Frank Alexander points out that minimum size requirements lack a rigorous empirical basis and may reflect the "social preferences of politically influential groups," and that requiring "one
person per room, or even two persons per room, represent[s] a conscious choice to allocate personal spending on something other than
housing. "232
Housing access is subsidized federally via the Section 8 housing
voucher program, and also at the state and local levels.2 33 Just as
SNAP benefits can be used to purchase a wide variety of foods, Section 8 vouchers can be used to rent a wide range of housing types and
locations.234 Although the program is underfunded with a long waiting
list and landlords are free to refuse Section 8 tenants, the Section 8
program has nonetheless been praised for giving lower-income Americans a broader range of housing options,235 particularly in comparison
to the one-size-fits-all public housing that Section 8 was designed to
replace. Section 8 vouchers need not be used to rent the same quality
or type of housing typically purchased or rented by better-off consum232 Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America's Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privi-

lege, 54

EMORY

L.J. 1231, 1255-56 (2005) (arguing that housing "standards may well reflect the

values, customs, or prejudices of a dominant subclass of American culture," and observing that
the "criterion of minimum square footage was derived in part from upper class usage").
233 See Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URB. DEV., https://
www.hud.gov/topics/housing-choicevoucher-program-section_8

[https://perma.cc/W98H-

S5VM].
234

See id.

235 See Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV.,

Winter 2015, at 97, 143 ("Mobility programs[, such as Section 8,] support the dignity and

autonomy of residents in the sense that '[t]he ability to choose where to live and with whom to
associate is linked to the idea of freedom in the American popular imagination."'

(quoting

Michelle Adams, Separate and [Un]equal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the

Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L.

REV.

413, 424 (1996))); Rigel C. Oliveri,

Vouchers and Affordable Housing: The Limits of Choice in the PoliticalEconomy of Place, 54

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 795, 797 (2019) ("[B]ecause each voucher is used by an individual in
the private housing market, the program has the ability to ...
choice for home-seekers.").

provide a maximum amount of
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ers. Some state and local housing programs, meanwhile, are more similar to WIC in that they are more directive about what types of
housing they provide, and potentially include less luxurious options
such as micro-housing.23 6
3.

Education

State and federal law requires that education meet a basic level of
quality.237 But beyond these requirements, families and learners are
free to choose cheaper or costlier educational facilities, as well as
schools, colleges, and universities with different academic foci and
strengths. Education is available free of charge for children at the primary and secondary levels, and is subsidized for learners at the tertiary level via scholarships, grants, and public funding. Importantly, this
funding can be used to purchase tertiary education that is cheaper
than might be the norm for middle-class or wealthy learners: students
can use Pell Grants, for instance, for tuition at community colleges as
well as at four-year universities.238
4.

Insurance

The goods discussed above differ from health care in that they
are not provided using an insurance mechanism which has the potential to suffer from adverse selection. But home ownership requires the
purchase of insurance, and homeowners are offered a wide range of
choices about insurance-choices not only about premiums and deductibles, but also about whether or not to purchase coverage for certain specific types of loss.2 39 The same is true for optional renters
insurance.2 40 Similarly, while assessing health care quality requires expertise, the same is true for mortgage terms or higher education

quality.
236 See Lisa T. Alexander, Evicted: The Socio-Legal Case for the Right to Housing, 126

YALE L.J.F. 431, 443 (2017).
237 See Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1001, 129 Stat. 1802, 1814 (2015)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2018)); College Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP'T
EDUC.,

https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html#Overview

.cc/X9ZL-KNP2].
238 Emma Kerr, Everything You Need to Know About the Pell Grant, U.S.
REP. (Mar.

[https://perma

NEWS

& WORLD

28, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/arti

cles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-pell-grant [https://perma.cc/PM56-4L8Z].
239 See Property Insurance, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/property-insurance#item-36587

[https://perma.cc/FP3S-3A7F].
240

See id.
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Misprediction

The preceding examples support allowing choice in purchasing
essential goods. This Section responds to the objection that allowing
choice regarding health insurance, particularly in combination with
the long-term contracts discussed in Part JJJ,241 exposes people to the
risk of mispredicting their future needs and values.
Some critics cite concerns about misprediction to justify limiting
patients' choices. Criticisms of "consumer-directed health care" stress
that health care needs are difficult to predict, 2 4 2 and that consumers
will make poor choices when given the opportunity to choose. 243 Concerns about misprediction have also been used to support objections
to advance medical directives, 2 4 4 and to patients' ability to consent to
medical procedures that are irreversible or burdensome to reverse,
such as organ donation, 2 45 physician-assisted dying, 2 4 6 sterilization, 247
and surgery to affirm gender or address gender dysphoria.2 4 8
241

See Cassel, supra note 193, at 59 (arguing that health care needs cannot be predicted).

242 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
243 See Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 74-76); Wendy K. Mariner, Can ConsumerChoice Plans Satisfy Patients?Problems with Theory and Practicein Health Insurance Contracts,
BROOK. L. REV. 485, 518 (2004) ("What a consumer wants, or can currently afford, may not

69

suffice when that consumer becomes a patient.").
244 E.g., Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One's Say?, 89 KY.
L.J. 327, 347 (2001) ("[P]eople cannot accurately predict advances in health care or what course
they will actually want followed in certain circumstances. When the time comes to act ...

circum-

stances and consequences may be wildly divergent from those existing or imagined at the time of
the creation of the directive."); Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 164 n.137 (2008) (discussing, but rejecting, the view that "we ought to abolish advance directives written by the healthy,
accepting only those written once a patient is ill and able to properly assess his or her treatment
preferences").
245 E.g., Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV.
591, 608-10 (2006) (arguing that "emerging adults" should have to meet a higher "deliberative
consent" standard in order to receive various non-emergent interventions such as "sperm donation, surrogacy, breast implants, genetic tests, sterilization, many forms of cosmetic surgery, and
perhaps even tattoos,"

as well as "live kidney and liver donations" and "bone marrow

donations").
246 E.g., Kathleen McGowan, Physician Assisted Suicide a Constitutional Right?, 37 CATH.
LAw. 225, 253 (1997) ("[D]eath by assisted suicide is final and does not allow a change of heart.
As such, it creates a definite risk of 'irreversible error."').
247

E.g., Atwell, supra note 245, at 610; Piers Benn & Martin Lupton, Sterilisation of Young,

Competent, and Childless Adults, 330

BRIT.

MED. J. 1323, 1324 (2005) (discussing "whether the

possibility that the patient will later regret the decision to be sterilised should be taken into
account when deciding whether to offer the procedure").

248 E.g., Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cry., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1300
(M.D. Fla. 2018) (explaining that surgical interventions for patients "with gender dysphoria or
who seek gender affirmance . . . may be delayed until the age of legal majority because, unlike
the other treatments, they are largely irreversible"); see also Lindsee A. Acton, Overturning In
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These concerns about misprediction and regret, however, have
not precluded the availability of consumer-directed health plans or irreversible procedures. This willingness to permit self-binding medical
decisions is consistent with our attitude toward other major commitments, such as marriage, parenthood, career preparation, and the assumption of mortgage or educational debt. In none of these cases do
we regard misprediction or regret-despite its frequency-as sufficient to prevent competent adults from limiting and shaping their future options.249

The movement away from medical paternalism and toward patient autonomy and informed consent was predicated on the importance of allowing patients to select the treatments they value. Marshall
Kapp identifies the connection between choice and autonomy in a defense of consumer-directed health care, stating,
[T]he ethical principle of autonomy dictates that it ought to
be the individual health care consumer who is afforded both
the right and responsibility to make decisions about the allocation of limited health care dollars for his or her own health
care services (i.e., what will be purchased and what will be
foregone). This ethical position promotes respect for individuals by economically empowering purchasers to be in control
of their own respective health care programs, to the extent
individuals can be in control in a real world of finite
resources. 25 0
From Kapp's perspective, opponents of consumer-directed health
care "seek to infantilize" individual health care purchasers "by suggesting that health care is somehow so different (i.e., so much more
inherently and irreducibly complex and confusing) than other sorts of
consumer goods and services that [purchasing] decisions . . . are too
inscrutable and emotionally charged for mere consumers themselves
to possibly figure out." 25 ' Kapp concludes: "In reality, though, it is
highly debatable whether health care purchases are that much more
re Gardiner: Ending Transgender Discrimination in Kansas, 48 FAM. L.Q. 563, 569 (2014) (explaining that guidelines for access to surgical treatment for gender dysphoria require patients to
"undergo typically twelve months of hormone therapy" and to "live successfully for twelve
months in a full-time real-life experience as the desired sex/gender").

249 See, e.g., Pifer v. Pifer, 12 Va. Cir. 448, 452 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1975) (refusing to grant an
annulment based on a mistake of fact on the basis that "no contract involving the risk of facts
and events not foreseen-which is particularly inherent in the marital state-would be safe from
attack or being set at naught").
250 Marshall B. Kapp, The Ethical Foundations of Consumer-Driven Health Care, 12 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'Y 1, 6 (2009) (footnote omitted).

251 Id.
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fundamentally incomprehensible than other important decisions that
consumers make every day about buying, for example, real property,
life and casualty insurance, financial investments, or automobiles." 25 2
The Affordable Choices approach agrees with Kapp's recognition of
the link between autonomy and patient choice, but improves on the
model of consumer-directed health care that Kapp advocates in two
ways. First, it provides a basis for regulating the menu of health insurance options to protect purchasers, third parties, and society-just as
purchasers are protected from dangerous financial investments.2 5 3 Second, moving spending decisions earlier, to the point when insurance is
purchased as opposed to the later point when care is actually received,
avoids exposing patients to the unpredictable risk of out-of-pocket
spending.
Turning briefly from ethics to doctrine, purchasers who have mispredicted their insurance needs could conceivably attempt to rescind
their insurance contracts on mistake-of-fact grounds. But this is implausible for two reasons. First, buyers' lack of knowledge of their
own health needs is what makes insurance rational to buy and sell.2 5 4
Second, purchasers would gain little from successfully rescinding the
contract.25 5
Even though misprediction is unlikely to lead to the legal invalidation of insurance contracts, it is still normatively worth combating.
Providing a framework for evaluating options could help combat misprediction. Decision aids and counseling processes have been developed to help people choose medical tests and procedures, 256
252 Id. (footnote omitted).
253 See Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC's "Accred-

ited Investor" Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2009).
254 Cf Grenall v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 4th 188, 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (rejecting argument that an annuity contract entered into by a purchaser with an undiagnosed terminal illness was void for mistake of fact, because "such risks are an inherent part of
life annuity contracts, which reflect, at their essence, a longevity wager measured by average life
expectancy").
255

Cf Mariner, supra note 243, at 538 (noting that a successful rescission "would only

excuse the patient's performance, which consists of paying insurance premiums and copayments;
it would not require performance of a different sort from the insurer").

256 Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 895 (2019) (discussing "interactive 'patient decision aids,' which are tools designed not only to provide information but to help patients sort through the available options in light of their personal values and
goals"); Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case

for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 464 (2006) (discussing "decision
aids" that "collect and analyze the latest clinical evidence regarding the risks and benefits of
different treatment options and then present the information in a manner patients can
understand").
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mortgages, 2 7 colleges, 2 8 and even whether and whom to marry.259
Federal funding has even been appropriated for the development of
medical decision aids. 260 Just as decision aids help patients choose
among specific medical treatments, they could likewise assist purchasers in selecting health insurance packages that match their values.2 6
Default rules and other types of choice architecture that present purchasers with choices that are likely to align with their values could also
help combat misprediction, especially when tailored to specific groups
or demographics. 262 Choice architecture could also be designed to specifically identify and promote plans that prior purchasers least regret
buying.2 63 The Affordable Choices framework does this by offering a
regulated set of options that have been embraced in similar places.
Unlike pre-ACA "junk" or "mini-med" plans that were advertised as
insurance, but which covered almost none of the cost of major medical
procedures, 264 international reference coverage plans, for example,
would cover a set of treatments that have been judged acceptable in
major developed countries like Canada or the United Kingdom.
Allison Hoffman has recently questioned the potential of choice
architecture to reduce misprediction in health insurance.26 5 The litera257

Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social PsychologicalAnal-

ysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 113 (2010).
258 Maurice R. Dyson, Are We Really Racing to the Top or Leaving Behind the Bottom?
&

Challenging Conventional Wisdom and DismantlingInstitutionalRepression, 40 WASH. U. J.L.

POL'Y 181, 198 (2012).
259 Nicole Licata, Note, Should Premarital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Requisite to Ob-

taining a Marriage License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 518, 518 (2002).
260 See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(d) (2018) (discussing a "[p]rogram to develop, update and produce patient decision aids to assist health care providers and patients").
261 See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-BasedConsumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1358
(2015) (discussing "choice engines used to help consumers make complex decisions (like choosing an optimal health insurance plan)" (footnote omitted)).
262 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure

with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1444 (2014) (discussing the personalization of default
rules depending on patients' values); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 76 (2011) (examining the proposal
that defaults be chosen by "intelligent assignment"); Annette Rid & David Wendler, Use of a
Patient Preference Predictor to Help Make Medical Decisions for Incapacitated Patients, 39 J.
MED. & PHIL. 104, 104 (2014) (proposing the use of a "Patient Preference Predictor" that uses
surveys and demographics to predict the care that an incapacitated patient would choose).
263 Cf Kristin Madison, Patients as "Regulators"?Patients' Evolving Influence over Health

Care Delivery, 31 J.

LEGAL MED.

9, 23 (2010) (noting the concern that "consumers may make

decisions based on short-term financial consequences, without a full understanding of their decisions' long-term financial and health consequences").
264 See Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 23, at 306.
265 See Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 29-33).

CHOOSING AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE

2020]

873

ture on which Hoffman bases her critique, however, focuses on the
inability of choice architecture to rectify poor financial decisions that
individuals make when choosing between plans with similar or identical content, such as ACA exchange or Medicare Advantage plans.2 6 6
Although she asserts that individuals will also fail to effectively choose
between plans with different content, this argument is speculative because content choice has not been empirically examined in depth. And
there is some-though not decisive-reason to think that choice architecture may be more effective at reducing misprediction and decisional regret when individuals are making choices about what
treatments they value, rather than making choices about how to pay
for treatments. 267
The risk of misprediction must also be weighed against the benefits of choice. Eliminating choice avoids the possibility of misprediction, just as it eliminates adverse selection. But eliminating choice also
sacrifices the gains in well-being and autonomy that are realized when
patients can select a plan that better matches their values.
C.

Undesirable Options and BargainingPower

Offering insurance purchasers more options could harm them by
weakening their bargaining power. Consider Thomas Schelling's famous example: one way to win a game of "chicken"-where two cars
drive straight at each other, and the first to swerve loses-is to throw
your steering wheel out the window, thereby signaling that you have
no option but to continue straight ahead.2 6 8 The driver with fewer options is more likely to prevail.
A Schelling-esque situation could arise for insurance purchasers
if having more options exposes them to pressure from family members
or society to select cheaper plans or reduces sympathy for purchasers
whose choices turn out badly. 269 For instance, even though poor buyers might be better off if public spending was used to purchase both
the cheaper package of interventions offered by the United King266
267

See id.
See Nicholas L. Berlin et al., Feasibility and Efficacy of Decision Aids to Improve Deci-

sion Making for Postmastectomy Breast Reconstruction:A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,
39 MED. DECISION MAKING 5, 6-8, 13 (2019) (finding that decision aids for patients making
choices about mastectomy or breast reconstruction reduced decision regret and improved patient knowledge).
268

See THOMAS

SCHELLING,

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

116-18 (1966).

269 See Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 33) (criticizing Korobkin's proposal on the
basis that "an insurer, hospital, or policymaker can claim that someone chose her own fate if she
selected a Level 5 plan, when later denied Level 6 medical care").
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dom's National Health Service and the difference between the NHS
package and a full-service package in the form of a cash grant or assistance with other goods like food or housing, 2 70 the availability of the
NHS package could instead simply lead to its being provided instead
of the full package. Concerns about pressure to choose undesirable
options have been raised as justifications for regulating or limiting
choice in other contexts.
That an option could expose some purchasers to unwanted pressure to choose a cheaper option, or could make it possible to reduce
public spending, does not settle whether the options should be available-just as it does not settle similar debates elsewhere. Concerns
about options and bargaining power are best seen as an invitation for
more empirical research. Just as adverse selection and misprediction
present trade-offs between the advantages and downsides of choice,
the same is true for concerns about undesirable options. While purchasers have an interest in avoiding undesirable options, they also
have an interest in obtaining affordable health insurance that aligns
with their values.
D.

Decision Fatigue

Choosing between health insurance plans may be psychologically
burdensome. Empirical evidence shows that people find it burdensome to navigate trade-offs between cost and medical need.2 71 The
trade-offs examined, however, involve "the way[s] in which cost sharing causes subjective disutility." 272 Affordable Choices plans, where
decisions about financing come long before care is needed, may be
more akin to the choice to "outsource the rationing function to someone else-whether it is the physician, the insurer, a government regulator, or some third party." 273 In an Affordable Choices framework,
patients "insource" the decision of what care to receive to an earlier
time where medical needs are less pressing.
Beyond shifting the time at which decisions are made, there may
be other ways to reduce the psychological burden of insurance decisions. Psychological research suggests that people have a finite stock
of willpower available in a given amount of time, and that making
270 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
271 Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Burden of Deciding for Yourself

The Disutility Caused by Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Spending, 11 IND. HEALTH L.
(2014) (considering whether "it may ...

REV.

609, 617

be stressful and otherwise psychologically burdensome

for patients to think about . . . costs when making decisions").
272 Id. at 631.
273 Id. at 618.
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complex decisions, such as choosing between health plans, depletes
this stock.2 7 4 Offering purchasers a small default menu of plans, and
having them only view a broader range of plans if they opt in, could
help to reduce decision fatigue.275 Some research on consumer decisions in a non-health context suggests that a single-digit menu of
choices is preferable both to no choice and to an excessive number of
choices.27 6
Going further, Affordable Choices plans could reduce both decision fatigue and misprediction and still preserve meaningful choice by
standardizing deductibles and copayments and by offering a more limited range of premiums while allowing the package of interventions to
vary, reversing the current norm of standardizing interventions while
allowing wide variation in premiums and other costs. Replacing the
current regime of choice, which mostly involves weighing upfront premiums against point-of-service deductibles and copayments, with a regime of content choice might both improve decision-making and make
it less stressful. 277 That patients struggle to make good decisions between plans with identical content yet complex differences in financing, as Hoffman and others have documented, 278 does not foreclose
the potential value of permitting patients to choose between plans
with qualitatively meaningful differences in content. Most patients are
not experts in economics or in insurance design, but they do have a
broad idea of the sort of future life they want.
Legal academic Seana Shiffrin, meanwhile, argues that personal
decisions should be based on reasons closely related to an individual's
own plans and projects, and that individuals should in some cases be
shielded from the financial dimensions of those decisions.279 Shiffrin
274 See Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1390 (2011) ("[S]elf-control
seems to share a common, depletable fund with other cognitive tasks, such as decision making. . . . [T]he notion that willpower exertions are taxing seems quite robust.").
275 See Robertson & Yokum, supra note 271, at 623 ("[A] variety of experimental and field
studies have revealed a 'paradox of choice,' wherein the availability of more choice options actually decreases decision quality and satisfaction."); cf Monahan, supra note 130, at 531 (discussing
how more limited plans offer a "simplified shopping experience").
276 See Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 253,
283-84 (2008) (describing that, in the context of consumer decision-making, a set size of 6 was
preferable to set sizes of 30 or 24, set sizes of 3 and 6 were preferable to a set size of 9, and that
set sizes of 6 and 30 were both preferable to a no-choice condition, and concluding that "tiered
consent is preferable to blanket consent[ and that] some choice is preferable to virtually none").
277 Cf Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 24-26) (offering evidence that even informed consumers struggle with premiums).
278 See id.
279 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommoda-

tion, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (2000).
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argues, for example, that society should not allow smokers to be
charged more for medical insurance, because decisions about whether
to smoke should be made in light of the impact of smoking on their
own personal life goals. 280 More generally, she argues that society
should assume the costs of decisions that "are highly personal ones
involving the body," or that are "difficult to make and involve hard
cases, difficult judgments, or areas in which agents are highly vulnerable or susceptible to overvaluing the opinions or effects on others." 28
Shiffrin's approach would insulate individuals not only from the
financial effects of their health status, but also from the effects of their
health choices. As a practical matter, the ACA rejects Shiffrin's approach: it permits insurers to charge smokers more and wellness program participants less. 28 2 And as a normative matter, Shiffrin's
approach is contestable. While people should not be denied essential
treatments, it is acceptable to ask them to bear some of the cost of
receiving treatment where reasonable disagreement exists about the
worth of that treatment.

V.
A.

FAIRNESS TO SOCIETY: SOLIDARITY AND EXTERNALITIES

Solidarity and the Need for a Single Plan

Some have argued that while a single national insurance plan
would promote social solidarity, choice would diminish solidarity between people whose health-related values differ.2 8 3 This concern can
be understood empirically or conceptually. The empirical concern is
that diminished solidarity will weaken social support for health insurance.2 8 4 While this concern is difficult to reject without data, one reason for skepticism is that people in other contexts regard themselves
as common beneficiaries of the same institution and serve as a powerful force for maintaining it, even while receiving different individual
benefits from the institution. For instance, alumni of a university may
share pride in their alma mater despite having pursued different
degrees.
280
281

Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 248.

282 Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 Duo. L. REV. 271, 288 (2012).
283 See, e.g., Rashi Fein, Health Care Reform, 267 Scl. AM. 46, 50 (1992) (suggesting that

"by including everyone" in the same plan, "the fates of diverse income groups are inexorably
intertwined").
284 See id.
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The conceptual concern, in contrast, sees individual choice between different health insurance options as necessarily socially divisive. This concern is often levied against "consumer-directed" health
insurance plans,28 5 and deploys some of the same language used to
criticize "neoliberal" policy initiatives more generally for their alleged
overemphasis on choice.2 8 6 Lars Thorup Larsen and Deborah Stone,
for instance, describe "enabling citizens to choose among multiple insurance plans" as one of three elements that "characterize neoliberal
reforms." 28 7 Larsen and Stone's other two elements are the placement
of health insurance under the control of private firms, and the introduction of "market competition where formerly there had been public-sector dominance or monopoly." 288 As explained in Part II, content
choice need not involve privatization or markets, but it does involve
providing citizens with choice and, therefore, also involves competition among plans.
The Affordable Choices approach, however, is not neoliberal as
Stone and Larsen define the term: it does not "hold individual freedom as the highest political value," nor is it inattentive to "how poverty and powerlessness constrain . . . choice[ ]."289 Nor does it require
the contraction of the state and the expansion of the private sector.
But the Affordable Choices framework is liberal,290 because it regards
285 See Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 297, 306-07 (2016) (criticizing the view, attributed to the ACA's architects, that "health insurance should be like mainstream consumer goods-offered on an internetdriven marketplace, with sufficient choice to enable consumers to expertly weigh their preferences for containing costs"); cf. Marshall B. Kapp, Home and Community-Based Long-Term
Services and Supports: Health Reform's Most Enduring Legacy?, 8 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 9, 29 (2014) (describing views that "portray consumer choice negatively as a neoliberal
conspiracy").
286 See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,
77 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 13 (criticizing "the picture of economic life that
neoliberalism celebrates" which glorifies "equal enjoyment of unfettered consumer choice, either as a buyer of traditional commodities or as a consumer of any other activity that can be
recast as a form of individual consumption"); Benjamin Justice, The Originalist Case Against
Vouchers: The FirstAmendment, Religion, and American Public Education, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 437, 441 (2015) (describing the core tenet of neoliberalism as "enhancing consumer
choice").
287

Lars Thorup Larsen & Deborah Stone, Governing Health Care Through Free Choice:

Neoliberal Reforms in Denmark and the United States, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 941,

941-42 (2015).
288 Id. at 942.
289 Id. at 945; see also Grewal & Purdy, supra note 286, at 6 (describing neoliberalism as
committed to economic efficiency, strong property rights, and markets).
290 See Hila Keren, Women in the Shark Tank: Entrepreneurship and Feminism in a Ne-

oliberal Age, 34 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 75, 112 (2016) (discussing how "both liberal and neoliberal traditions associate [consumer choice] with liberty and autonomy").

878

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:819

the ability to make consequential choices about one's life-including
one's health-as an important, albeit not the single paramount,
value 291
Its liberal commitment to choice makes the Affordable Choices
approach uncongenial to perspectives that reject individual choice in
favor of social agreement on a common plan. Such perspectives are
more often expressed in recent debates by adherents of non-liberal
left views, but are also compatible with right-wing authoritarian views
that stress the importance of shared community values. 2 92 For example, notwithstanding the freedom of choice that SNAP benefits afford
recipients, some critics on the left have argued that SNAP should be
replaced by publicly provided meals with standardized ingredients,293
while the Trump Administration has made similar arguments from a
right-wing perspective.294
The sort of solidarity compatible with the Affordable Choices
framework-so-called liberal solidarity-is normatively preferable to
so-called communitarian solidarity. 295 Under liberal solidarity, people
collectively commit to support social institutions that enable a diverse
291

Cf Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the "Sharing" Economy, 91 WASH. L.

REV.

1397, 1456

(2016) (discussing a "pluralistic theory [that] does not advocate unrestrained choice: in cases of
market failure, harm to third parties, and opportunistic behavior pluralistic theory endorses a
system with some restrictions").
292

Cf Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but Mis-

guided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China, 98 Nw.

U. L. REV. 991, 1070 (2004) (identifying the "higher priority assigned by statist socialists (as well
as neo-authoritarians and communitarians) to social stability relative to individual freedoms").
293

Nathan J. Robinson, A Public Option for Food, CURRENT AFF. (Nov. 6, 2017) https://

www.currentaffairs.org/2017/11/a-public-option-for-food

[https://perma.cc/FP3S-3A7F].

294 Sasha Abramsky, "America's Harvest Box" Captures the Trumpian Attitude Toward
Poverty, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/americasharvest-box-captures-the-trumpian-attitude-toward-poverty
("Currently, SNAP benefits are ...

[https://perma.cc/5HCV-6RDP]

spendable at almost any store that sells food. The Depart-

ment of Agriculture wants to dock about half of that money and replace

it with

an 'America's

Harvest box,' consisting of '100 percent U.S.-grown and produced food."').
295 I draw this distinction from the debate in political theory between liberal and communi-

tarian thinkers. See Daniel Bell, Communitarianism, STAN.

ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.

2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/communitarianism/

(Mar. 21,

[https://perma.cc/

LCS8-DZ6X] (contrasting liberalism, on which "the principal task of government is to secure
and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need to lead freely chosen
lives," with "the Aristotelian ideal of the intimate, reciprocating local community bound by
shared ends"). The distinction between liberal and communitarian approaches has influenced
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1561 (2016) (observing that "liberals argue that we do not
share thick or substantive first-order ethical ideas, so we must find thin or procedural secondorder ideas to agree about for purposes of regulating public life; communitarians answer that the
second-order agreement is illusory and that we can and do find agreement on the first order").
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range of individual choices and lifestyles, rather than pledging allegiance to one specific way of life. 296 As an example, recall alums' common pride in and allegiance to their alma mater, despite the wide
range of different experiences possible within the same university.
Liberal solidarity is compatible with the diverse values and identities
that characterize successful, modern-day market democracies.2 97 In
contrast, communitarian solidarity, in which people share an allegiance to a common vision of worthwhile health care, tends to entrench and mandate majority values, and will see diverse ways of life
as a weakness rather than a strength. 298 Liberal solidarity, for instance,
is more likely to allow minority groups to select access to Medicare or
Medicaid benefits that diverge from the treatments preferred by the
maj ority.299
Liberal solidarity's emphasis on institutions that facilitate individual choice rather than those that require collective choice has particular appeal in the health care arena. While the collective provision of
education means that society or local communities may need to collectively choose a single curriculum for primary and secondary education, health care services are provided individually rather than
collectively. Under some circumstances, individual choice better fosters solidarity than collective choice.30O Juxtaposing Emanuel's initial
critique of educational vouchers-that "they seem to encourage private, market choices rather than communal deliberation and action"301-with his later work illustrates this point. Emanuel initially
argues that his proposal for health insurance vouchers does not suffer
from the same problems as educational vouchers because
296 See Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to

Legal-Rights Questions, 74

CHI.-KENT

L.

REV.

415, 455 (1999) (claiming that "liberals . . . are

definitionally committed to the second-order good of individuals' choosing for themselves what
to value"); cf Kleinfeld, supra note 295, at 1561 (describing liberals as committed to agreement
on procedure rather than substance).
297

See Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOzO L.

REV. 1915, 1939-42 (2001).
298 See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 995-96 (1994)
(arguing that "communitarianism, with its emphasis on listening to the 'moral voice of the community' and holding individuals to 'values we all share,' does not take diversity and pluralism
seriously enough"); Schuck, supra note 297, at 1946-47 (arguing that although "liberalism is
conducive and congenial to diversity, [the] communitarian vision . . . finds diversity at best problematic to its program of communal cohesion," because "at the heart of the communitarian vision are not individual purposes but common ones").
299 See, e.g., Tips for Choosing a Health Plan, supra note 185.
300

See EMANUEL, supra note 112, at 187-88.

301

Id. at 188.
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the worst aspects of a voucher system-its undermining of
communal association and decision-making-will be limited . . . because individuals and families will not just be

purchasing a good, but will be participating in deciding poli.

cies under which they will receive their medical care...
[T]he way a CHP makes decisions regarding the provision of
health care services will require citizen-members to participate in communal deliberations.302
Emanuel's initial proposal to base content choice on communal
deliberation rather than regulated individual choice overlooks a factor
that his later critique of single-payer insurance identifies.303 Communal deliberation can provoke conflict, 304 whereas facilitating individual
choice is likely to foster greater harmony and solidarity. This possibility is particularly acute for sensitive and personal topics like health
care. 305 In a diverse society like present day America, the choice between a variety of prepackaged Affordable Choices plans with content
deliberation outsourced to other national systems is even more clearly
preferable to a collective deliberative effort that attempts to reach
consensus on a single, federally-administered national plan. 306
Solidarity concerns might translate into mandates that all insurance plans include coverage for certain conditions. Such mandates
may, for example, require all plans to provide treatments that have
large benefits for society in general, such as vaccinations, lead screening, or treatments for childhood illnesses.307 Requiring coverage for
302

Id.

See Emanuel, supra note 50, at 41.
304 See Jack Knight & James Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation:On the Possibility of
303

Democratic Legitimacy, 22 POL. THEORY 277, 286 (1994); see also Tali Mendelberg & John

Oleske, Race and Public Deliberation, 17 POL. COMM. 169, 171-72 (2000) (discussing conflict
arising from deliberation).
305 Cf Joseph Heath, More Democracy (unpublished manuscript), http://homes.chass.utor
onto.ca/~jheath/Oldch11.pdf

[https://perma.cc/AX35-HJ9D]

nomics" proposal in which "households ...

(criticizing a "participatory

eco-

aggregate their plans at the neighborhood level, with

an additional process of democratic deliberation and revision," because "this means that your
neighbors get to snoop through your consumption plan, and vote down anything they don't

like").
306

Cf Emanuel, supra note 50, at 41 ("[W]hen single-payer advocates think about who

would run the national health plan, they think of Ted Kennedy. But . . . what if the head were
Dick Cheney?"). But see Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 80-85) (arguing that collective
deliberation about the design of health plans can be successful).
307 See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, FederalRegulation, or Free Market? An Examination

of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1367 ("Mandated health benefits
can . . . address problems related to externalities. . . . The positive externalities associated with
immunization are a common example of externalities resulting in a suboptimal level of insurance."); Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failuresand the Evolution of State Regulation
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treatments with positive social externalities, as discussed in the next
Section, is consistent with the values underpinning Affordable
Choices plans. But other such mandates might require treatments for
which patient and provider interest groups have lobbied, including
chiropractic procedures, in vitro fertilization, and off-label treatments
for cancer. 308 Within a framework of liberal solidarity, some discrete
groups' desire for everyone to have access to treatments they provide
or personally value is not a persuasive reason to require the public
subsidization of such access.

'

Several factors mitigate potential conflict between state benefit
mandates and Affordable Choices plans. First, state benefit mandates
do not apply to self-insured plans under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act, 309 such as the Bind plans discussed in Section
I.D.310 Second, some states explicitly allow insurers to offer "limited
benefit" plans that need not comply with state benefit mandates;3 1
while limited benefit plans have been unpopular because they exclude
highly valued treatments (such as all hospital services), Affordable
Choices plans that offer a broad range of services could present more
popular options. Third, many benefit mandates require only some degree of coverage for a specified condition, which international reference coverage plans, for instance, already provide. Lastly, even if
Affordable Choices plans are constrained by state or local benefit
mandates, they would still provide cost savings so long as the number
of mandates is not excessive.

of Managed Care, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 169, 195 (noting that some mandated benefits "are justified by classic public goods considerations (for example, coverage of
clinical trials), some by collective action or adverse selection concerns (for example, pregnancy),
and some by predictable forms of consumer irrationality (for example, mental health)").
308 See Sloan & Hall, supra note 307, at 195 (observing that some mandated benefits "respond only to private interests of providers or advocacy groups (for example, coverage of chiropractic care)"); see also David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government

Failure?,14 CONN. INS. L.J. 307, 315 (2008) (asserting that "provider lobbying ...

often aided by

a small group of affected patients and/or relatives of patients" typically motivates coverage mandates); cf Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under Health-

care Reform, 58 UCLA L.

REV.

221, 262 (2010) (proposing an "actuarial offset requirement

[that] would . . . require those advocating legislation or an amendment that would mandate
coverage of a particular benefit to identify offsetting exclusions").
309 Monahan, supra note 307, at 1371-72.
310 See supra Section I.D.2.
311

Isabel Friedenzohn, Limited-Benefit Policies: Public and Private-Sector Experiences,
STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES ISSUE BRIEF, July 2004, at 1, 1, http://www.statecoverage.org/
files/Limited-Benefit%20Policies%20-%20Public%20and%20Private-Sector%20Experiences_1

.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE6M-N58T].
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Solidarity concerns might also give rise to legal complaints that
Affordable Choices plans violate antidiscrimination provisions in the
ACA or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Such complaints have
been directed at plans that exclude treatments with poor cost-effectiveness. Oregon's Medicaid plan, for instance, has been accused of
illegal discrimination for excluding cancer treatment for patients with
poor prognoses. 312 Private insurers have similarly been accused of discriminating against patients with disabilities by imposing step therapy
requirements (where cheaper drugs must be tried before costlier ones)
only on certain treatments. 313 That Affordable Choices plans are selected by patients, rather than externally imposed, and that permission
is granted to insurers to use "reasonable medical management technique[s]"314 makes the charge of discrimination less compelling.
B.

Externalities

As discussed above, treatments that have large benefits for the
general public are appropriate for benefit mandates. 315 For instance,
all Affordable Choices plans should include vaccinations and prenatal
care. These interventions share a core feature with many public goods,
namely that they have benefits-positive externalities in economic
terms-for the public.316
Health care, however, is not typically a public good. 317 Unlike
paradigm public goods like clean air, health care is excludable (people
can be kept from receiving it) and rival (two people cannot simultaneously take the same pill or be operated on by the same surgeon).318
Subsidized access to medical care-or mandatory purchase of that
312 Persad, supra note 69, at 145.
313

See Sharona Hoffman, Step Therapy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Implications of a Cost-

Cutting Measure, 73 FOOD &

DRUG

L.J. 38, 52 (2018); see also Steven D. Pearson, Why the

Coming Debate over the QALY and Disability Will Be Different, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHics 304, 306
(2019) (discussing criticism of an employer who launched "a new health insurance plan for its
employees in which coverage could be denied if a new drug did not meet a specific [cost-effectiveness] threshold").
314 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health

Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,847 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156).
315

See Monahan, supra note 307, at 1367.
316 See Elhauge, supra note 104, at 1480-81 ("[I]mmunizations have a health benefit 'external' to the purchaser: they protect other persons against the spread of any contagious diseases
that unimmunized persons might otherwise contract.").
317 M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035,
1090 (1992) ("[M]edical care is not a public good."). Contra Madison & Jacobson, supra note 11,

at 116 ("[H]ealth care is a public good.").
318 See Bloche, supra note 317, at 1090 ("For any given level of aggregate medical services
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care-is instead typically justified by a societal commitment to at least
some medical treatments being "merit goods" that should be universally accessible, just as some, but not all, types of food and housing
are. 319
Even when a treatment lacks obvious positive health externalities, seeing others suffer the bad consequences of going untreated may
be unsettling.320 For instance, a patient who purchases a plan that excludes heart transplants and then dies of preventable heart failure
may upset others, even if there are compelling reasons to prioritize
other spending over heart transplant coverage. Such outcomes will be
infrequent, but possible, in Affordable Choices plans. Ultimately, psychological upset suffered by others-in contrast to physical harmcannot justify limiting competent decisionmakers' reasonable choices
regarding what health care to obtain. The legal limits of the right to
refuse medical treatment illustrate the difference between psychological upset and risk of physical harm. Patients can be quarantined or
forced to receive treatment because of risks to others' health,321 but
they cannot be forced to receive treatment merely because their refusal would upset others or contravene community values. 322
expenditure, caring for one patient reduces the services available to others. Moreover, exclusion
of nonpaying patients poses little administrative difficulty.").
319 See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American
Health Care, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 51 ("[H]ealth care is a paradigmatic
example of a so-called merit good, something that society does not wish to see distributed solely
on the basis of individuals' ability and willingness to pay. But characterizing health care in general as a merit good does not preclude its being treated as a consumer good at the margin.");
Mead Over, The Public Interest in a Private Disease: An Economic Perspective on the Govern-

ment Role in STD and HIV Control, in

SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES

3, 4 (3d ed. 1999)

("[A]lthough food is a private, not a public, good, many societies guarantee a minimum amount
of it to everyone on the grounds that it is a 'basic need' or 'merit good.'").
320 See Mark A. Hall, Public Choice and Private Insurance: The Case of Small Group Market Reforms, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 757, 761 ("Adequate health care is a public good not only due
to contagious disease but because of the distress we feel when we see or contemplate others,
including our future selves, suffering or dying needlessly from preventable or correctable illness
or injury.").

321 E.g., In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App. 2003); In re Washington, 716 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (Kessler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (discussing a "scheme that gives public health departments the authority to compel persons
with contagious tuberculosis to accept treatment for the disease"), aff'd in part, disapproved in

part, 735 N.W.2d 111 (Wis. 2007).
322 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223, 1225 (N.J. 1985) ("In cases that do not
involve the protection of the actual or potential life of someone other than the decisionmaker,
the state's indirect and abstract interest in preserving the life of the competent patient generally
gives way to the patient's much stronger personal interest in directing the course of his own
life ...

even when

sion as a whole.").

it

conflicts with the advice of the doctor or the values of the medical profes-
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FAIRNESS TO PROVIDERS

Providers of medical treatment might object to Affordable
Choices plans either because they believe these plans may expose
them to malpractice liability if they honor the plans' exclusion of certain costly but potentially beneficial treatments, or because these
plans limit their professional autonomy regarding which treatments to
provide and prescribe. This Part considers these objections.
A.

Malpractice Liability

Medical providers may worry that not providing costly treatments, even at patients' direction, could expose them to malpractice
liability for falling below the customary standard of care. 323 Affordable Choices plans mitigate this concern in two ways. First, the reasonable disagreement principle discussed in Section II.B means that the
treatments excluded from Affordable Choices plans will not be ones
that physicians would invariably provide, and patients invariably request, in the absence of Affordable Choices plans' restrictions.
Rather, they will be treatments whose merits are in dispute, which
weakens the case for malpractice liability. 324 While medical practice
always involves some risk of malpractice liability, participating in an
Affordable Choices plan would not substantially raise the risk of liability. Second, physicians are increasingly recognized as having an ethical obligation to consider the risk of "financial toxicity" and discuss
this risk with patients.325 Isaac Buck has argued that this ethical obligation should give rise to a legal duty.326 By allowing patients to refuse
access to expensive treatments with dubious value, Affordable
323

See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, When Patients Say No (To Save Money): An

Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 CONN. L. REV. 743, 748 (2009) (discussing the scenario
of "a patient suing a doctor for substandard care where the patient refused recommended care
because it seemed too expensive").
324

Cf Berthelot v. Stallworth, 2003-1771 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/14/04); 884 So. 2d 648, 654

(denying medical malpractice claim on the basis that plaintiff's expert admitted that there were
"several standards in the medical community for ordering baseline mammograms"), writ denied,

2004-2516 (La. 1/28/05); 893 So. 2d 72.
325

Peter A. Ubel et al., Full Disclosure-Out-of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1484 (2013) ("[P]hysicians need to disclose the financial consequences of
treatment alternatives just as they inform patients about treatments' side effects."); see Alicia
Hall, FinancialSide Effects: Why Patients Should Be Informed of Costs, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,

May-June 2014, at 41, 43.
326

See Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the

Standard of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101, 144 (2017) (proposing a change in malpractice law such
that "when a patient is administered an expensive procedure, or a highly-priced pharmaceutical
drug, that patient could face legally compensable harm").
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Choices plans may protect physicians from liability for causing financial toxicity.
B.

Conscience and Freedom of Practice

Even absent concerns about malpractice liability, providers may
prefer to have access to the full spectrum of potential treatments for
conditions, without financially motivated limitations. Having to abide
by restrictions in Affordable Choices plans may be perceived by providers as destructive to trust between physicians and patients,327 psychologically burdensome, 3 28 or a cause of "moral distress." 3 2 9
Considering the cost of treatment can, indeed, be cognitively and
psychologically burdensome. But so can other duties, like a physician's duty to respect patients' values. The shift from paternalistic,
physician-driven decision-making to a regime that centers patients'
values was, and is, no doubt burdensome to many physicians who
found it easier to simply implement the treatment they believed was
best. 330 Yet, we regard the duty to consider and defer to patients' values to be an acceptable burden for physicians.
The case for asking physicians to consider costs as part of implementing Affordable Choices plans is particularly strong because the
costs at issue are ones that patients themselves have recognized as
relevant. Rather than asking providers to violate norms of trust or
interpersonal loyalty in the physician-patient relationship, as older
models of managed care were criticized for doing, Affordable Choices
plans ask providers to broaden their loyalty to patients to include a
concern for patients' financial well-being (which in turn affects their
health), 331 as well as recognize that different patients assign different
importance to health care. Asking a provider to consider costs by participating in an Affordable Choices plan no more makes them a
"double agent" 3 3 2 than asking them to consider quality as well as
length of life when choosing a treatment. In both cases, physicians
327

Cf M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L.

REV.

919, 923 (2002) (criticizing efforts to permit or require physicians to consider costs).
328

Maxwell J. Mehlman, Can Law Save Medicine?, 36 J.

LEGAL

MED. 121, 135-36 (2015)

(asserting that "some physicians will suffer psychologically" from considering costs).
329 Scott R. Berry et al., The Effect of Priority Setting Decisions for New Cancer Drugs on

Medical Oncologists' Practicein Ontario:A Qualitative Study, 7 BMC
196 (2007).

HEALTH SERVS. RES.

330 See Madison, supra note 263, at 25 ("The informed consent requirement ...

193,

inherently

limits individual physicians' abilities to dictate the course of treatment they provide.").
331 See Buck, supra note 326, at 138 (discussing the link between financial burden and lower

health-related quality of life).
332 See Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3

KENNEDY INST. ETHICS

J. 279, 280,
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demonstrate loyalty by considering multiple dimensions of patient

well-being.
Gregg Bloche has objected to the claim that abiding by patients'
choice of health plans accords with respecting their values and wellbeing, and argues that the freedom of choice of "later selves" supports
ignoring earlier commitments. 333 But regarding earlier and later selves
as normatively distinct would have radical implications stretching
across, and far beyond, health care. 334 In particular, once we accept
that earlier selves' authority could be limited in order to protect the
self-determination of later selves, it becomes difficult to resist limiting
earlier selves' authority in order to protect others more generally. 335
We should be suspicious of the selective invocation of multiple selves
in the medical context, particularly when its practical effect would be
to enlarge the scope of physicians' discretionary authority, increase
demand for costly services, and reduce the burden on physicians of
weighing patients' financial interests against their medical interests or
of saying no to a patient who could benefit from an intervention. 336
Focusing on a technically difficult surgery without having to think
about cost may enable physicians to enjoy the satisfaction of heroically exercising specialized skills, 337 but the more fraught and uncertain task of helping a patient weigh medical benefits against financial
282-84 (1993) (characterizing doctors as "double agents" who are asked to consider costs and
arguing "that we embrace this new ethic at our peril").
333

See Bloche, supra note 327, at 927-29.

334 See, e.g., Govind Persad, Evaluating the Legality of Age-Based Criteria in Health Care:
From Nondiscriminationand Discretion to Distributive Justice, 60 B.C. L.

REV.

889, 935 (2019)

(noting that adopting this view would make, for example, determining property rights and navigating familial relationships difficult).
335

See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 341 (1984) (arguing that, if we accept the

multiplicity of selves,

"[i]t

becomes more plausible to claim that ...

we are right to ignore

whether experiences come within the same or different lives").
336 See Bloche, supra note 327, at 928, 953 (noting that ill patients are more deferential to
physician judgment, arguing that "emotive, fearful, and hopeful thinking at moments of medical
crisis" should be prioritized over the "dispassionate, efficiency-oriented reasoning associated
with the ex ante perspective," and suggesting that "[n]eeds for care and respect, protection
against abandonment, and preservation of hope for rescue in dire circumstances engender health
care spending well in excess of levels we would choose ex ante"). Bloche does admirably recognize that his background as a physician influences his reasoning. Id. at 938 n.92.
337 M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 247, 306 n.201 (2003)
(observing that the "risks and costs of the rescue effort ...

endeavor's nobility"); see also

MIHALY

CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,

weigh . . . in favor of a rescue
FLOW

155-56 (1990) (noting that

"surgical operations have all the characteristics that a flow activity should have ..

[T]he sur-

geon's task is crystal-clear: to cut out the tumor, or set the bone, or get some organ pumping
away again," and that "[t]he way surgery is practiced helps block out distractions, and concentrates all one's attention on the procedure").
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burdens is arguably a truer expression of loyalty. While providers retain the legal right to refuse patients in Affordable Choices plans, just
as they retain the right to refuse Medicaid patients or only accept selfpay patients,338 their refusal should not be lauded as a rejection of
commercialism, but recognized as being in tension with patient selfdetermination.

CONCLUSION

America's health care system is ripe for improvement. Prices are
too high. Public health is underfunded. Ineffective interventions
abound. This Article's proposal to allow choice about the content of
health insurance will not fix every problem. But it is designed to be
complementary to other strategies for improving health care. Likewise, content choice would allow purchasers to select plans that address social determinants of health or exclude ineffective
interventions.339 Some who focus on the problem of excessive prices
have criticized efforts to rein in health care utilization as misguided.340
But it is no accident that countries that successfully tackle excessive
prices do so by controlling utilization.341
The problems with choice identified in health law scholarship remain real, and the critiques that have been offered are valuable. But
these critiques should neither romanticize the absence of choice nor
overestimate the efficacy of collective choice. It would be a mistake,
for instance, to abandon individual choice in favor of even the most
careful and deliberative effort to identify which college major, housing
338 See Sidney D. Watson, Lessons from Ferguson and Beyond: Bias, Health, and Justice, 18
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 111, 122 (2017) ("One out of four doctors and most dentists refuse to
treat Medicaid patients."); see also Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Koskinen, 768
F.3d 640, 641 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing physicians who "operate cash-only practices and do not
accept insurance").
339 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing social determinants); supra
Section II.B (discussing plans that rely on expert recommendations).
340 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting: Toward A

Postneoliberal Health-Reform Agenda, 77 LAw & CONTEMP.

PROBS.,

no. 4, 2014, at 171, 174

(asserting that although "some scolds claim excess utilization of health care in the United States
is driving costs .

.. , the most significant culprit behind exorbitant health care costs is high prices,
not overutilization"); Adam Gaffney, What the Health Care Debate Still Gets Wrong, Bos. REV.

(Oct. 17, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics/adam-gaffney-what-health-caredebate-still-gets-wrong [https://perma.cc/3XBC-S5RR] (similar).
341

See Bagley, supra note 175, at 563 (describing how the British National Health Service

limits costs); Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 77) (discussing cost control in Britain,
France, and Germany).
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style, or cuisine "the polity genuinely values." 3 4 2 These are all personal
decisions about which people deeply and reasonably disagree, reflecting differences in culture and identity. Health care is different, certainly, but not different enough to eliminate choice's value. And the
imperfections of real-world collective choice further strengthen the
case for individual choice. The justified hostility to the Trump Administration's attempt to supplant the food choices SNAP offers with a
"Harvest Box" of "100 percent U.S.-grown and produced food" 343 justifies equal wariness about its potential control over the content of a
single national health plan.344 That carefully organized, small-scale deliberative initiatives can produce plans that appeal to most or all participants does not mean that real world democracy should supplant
choice.
Nor should critiques of content choice assume that the inadequacy of current options, or the failure of choosers when faced with
those options, vitiates the value of choice. Universities limit choice in
many ways: for example, students do not hire faculty and are not allowed to choose courses arbitrarily or repeatedly take the same
course. Yet universities do-and should-allow students to choose
their majors or degrees, which are understood as packages of courses
curated by experts. Likewise, there is a compelling case against offering plans that are inferior in every way to others; innumerable plans
that cover the same interventions but have slightly different deductibles, premiums, and copayments; or "a la carte insurance" without
content restrictions. 345 But the Oregon Medicaid Plan and the United
Kingdom's NHS each offer distinct and well-designed packages of interventions, as even critics of choice concede. 346 Given that the United
Kingdom and Oregon plans are each choiceworthy on their own, there
is a compelling case for permitting them as options alongside the plans
342

Cf Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 87) (making this suggestion with respect to

health insurance).
343

See Abramsky, supra note 294; Alan Bjerga, Trump Plan to Swap Food Stamps for

Food Faces Skeptical Congress, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-20/trump-plan-to-swap-food-stamps-for-food-faces-skeptical-congress [https://perma.cc/P639-GQNW] (noting that Congressional committee leaders and
even the conservative Heritage Foundation were skeptical of the Harvest Box proposal).
344 See Emanuel, supra note 50, at 41.
345

See Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 16) (describing "dominated" plans); Quick

Cost and Plan Finder, supra note 156 (listing 45 plans); Sfondeles, supra note 134 (reporting
statement by Rep. Michael Doyle, D-Pa., in response to desire for insurance excluding prenatal
care, that "[t]here is no such thing as a-la-carte insurance").
346 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 77, 81) (praising the NHS and Oregon
plans).
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currently offered, just as we permit students to choose whether to major in economics or in political science. Choice between independently
desirable health plans would improve affordability, autonomy, and
quality in American health care.

